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Dr. Frank Mueller-Langer, Dipl.-Volksw., Dipl.-Kfm.

Affiliated Research Fellow

Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research

+49 89 24246-453
frank.mueller-langer(at)ip.mpg.de

Arbeitsbereiche:

Innovationsökonomie, Recht und Ökonomie, Industrieökonomie

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang

Seit 04/2014
Mitantragssteller des von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) geförderten Projektes European Data Watch Extended II

Seit 10/2013
Mitglied der Fakultät des Master-Programms "Intellectual Property and Competition Law" des Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC)

Seit 04/2013
Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb (Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research), Team Prof. Dietmar Harhoff, Ph.D.

2012 - 2013
Gastwissenschaftler an der University of Canterbury, Neuseeland

10/2008 - 03/2013
Akademischer Koordinator der International Max Research School for Competition and Innovation

2008
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschafswissenschaften, Universität Heidelberg, Team Prof. Dr. Jürgen Eichberger

2008
Gastwissenschaftler an der Columbia University, New York

2007
Gastwissenschaftler an der UC Berkeley

2004 - 2008
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Dozent und Doktorand am Institut für Recht und Ökonomik, Universität Hamburg (Doktorarbeit: "Creating R&D Incentives for Medicines for Neglected Diseases", Doktorvater: Prof. Dr. Hans-Bernd Schäfer)

2003 - 2004
Studium der Betriebswirtschaftslehre (Dipl.-Kfm.) an der Universität Hagen

1997 - 2003
Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Dipl.-Volksw.) an den Universitäten Bonn und Lissabon

Lebenslauf als PDF

Ehrungen und wissenschaftliche Preise

2013     Sloan Economics of Knowledge Contribution and Distribution Grant 2013, mit Richard Watt                                      (US $11,000)

2013     Nominierung für die Antitrust Writing Awards 2013 für den Aufsatz Parallel Trade and its                                         Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare (Review of International Economics, Vol. 20, No. 1, 177-185)

2011     "Best Paper Prize for 2011" der Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, mit Marc Scheufen                      (1.500 Euro)

2011     Tillburg Law and Economics Center "Innovation, Intellectual Property and Competition                                                 Policy Grant 2011", mit Richard Watt (15.000 Euro)

2009     Publikationsförderung, Max-Planck-Institut für Immaterialgüter- und Wettbewerbsrecht (1.500 Euro)


Stipendien

DFG-Doktorandenstipendium an der Universität Hamburg

DFG-Forschungsstipendium an der University of California, Berkeley

ERASMUS-Stipendium an der Universidade Nova de Lisboa

DAAD-Stipendium für Aufenthalt an der Universidad de Salamanca 

Mitgliedschaften

American Association of Law and Economics
American Economic Association
European Association of Law and Economics
European Association of Labour Economists
European Economic Association
European Policy for Intellectual Property Association
Italian Association of Law and Economics
Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues
Western Economic Association International

Persönliche Links

Publikationen

Artikel in referierten Fachzeitschriften

Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick; Mueller-Langer, Frank (2014). Open Access to Data: An Ideal Professed but Not Practised, Research Policy, 43 (9), 1621-1633. DOI

  • Data-sharing is an essential tool for replication, validation and extension of empirical results. Usinga hand-collected data set describing the data-sharing behaviour of 488 randomly selected empiricalresearchers, we provide evidence that most researchers in economics and management do not sharetheir data voluntarily. We derive testable hypotheses based on the theoretical literature on information-sharing and relate data-sharing to observable characteristics of researchers. We find empirical supportfor the hypotheses that voluntary data-sharing significantly increases with (a) academic tenure, (b) thequality of researchers, (c) the share of published articles subject to a mandatory data-disclosure policyof journals, and (d) personal attitudes towards “open science” principles. On the basis of our empiricalevidence, we discuss a set of policy recommendations.

Mueller-Langer, Frank (2013). Neglected Infectious Diseases: Are Push and Pull Incentive Mechanisms Suitable for Promoting Drug Development Research?, Health Economics, Policy and Law, 8 (2), 185-208.

  • Infectious diseases are among the main causes of death and disability in developing countries, and they are a major reason for the health disparity between rich and poor countries. One of the reasons for this public health tragedy is a lack of lifesaving essential medicines, which either do not exist or badly need improvements. In this article, we analyse which of the push and pull mechanisms proposed in the recent literature may serve to promote research into neglected infectious diseases. A combination of push programmes that subsidise research inputs through direct funding and pull programmes that reward research output rather than research input may be the appropriate strategy to stimulate research into neglected diseases. On the one hand, early-stage (basic) research should be supported through push mechanisms, such as research grants or publicly financed research institutions. On the other hand, pull mechanisms, such as prize funds that link reward payments to the health impacts of effective medicines, have the potential to stimulate research into neglected diseases.
  • Tag Cambridge DOI
  • http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1744133112000321

Mueller-Langer, Frank (2012). Parallel Trade and Its Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare, Review of International Economics, 20 (1), 177-185.

    Mueller-Langer, Frank; Scheufen, Marc (2011). Die ökonomische Analyse geistiger Eigentumsrechte (Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights), Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium: Zeitschrift für Ausbildung und Hochschulkontakt, 40 (3), 137-142.

      Mueller-Langer, Frank; Scheufen, Marc (2011). The Google Book Search Settlement: A Law and Economics Analysis, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 8 (1), 7-50.

      • Beginning in December 2004 Google has pursued a new project to create a book search engine (Google Book Search). The project has released a storm of controversy around the globe. While the supporters of Google Book Search conceive the project as a first reasonable step towards unlimited access to knowledge in the information age, its opponents fear profound negative effects due to an erosion of copyright law. Our law and economics analysis of the Book Search Project suggests that – from a copyright perspective – the proposed settlement may be beneficial to right holders, consumers, and Google. For instance, it may provide a solution to the still unsolved dilemma of orphan works. From a competition policy perspective, we stress the important aspect that Google’s pricing algorithm for orphan and unclaimed works effectively replicates a competitive Nash-Bertrand market outcome under post-settlement, third-party oversight.
      • Auch erschienen als: Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 11-06
      • Available at SSRN

      Mueller-Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard (2010). Copyright and Open Access for Academic Works, Review of economic research on copyright issues, 7 (1), 45-65.

      • In a recent paper, Prof. Steven Shavell (see Shavell, 2009) has argued strongly in favor of eliminating copyright from academic works. Based upon solid economic arguments, Shavell analyses the pros and cons of removal of copyright and in its place to have a pure open access system, in which authors (or more likely their employers) would provide the funds that keep journals in business. In this paper we explore some of the arguments in Shavell’s paper, above all the way in which the distribution of the sources of journal revenue would be altered, and the feasible effects upon the quality of journal content. We propose a slight modification to a pure open access system which may provide for the best of both the copyright and open access worlds.
      • Auch erschienen als: Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper No. 10-09
      • Available at SSRN

      Mueller-Langer, Frank (2009). Does Parallel Trade Freedom Harm Consumers in Small Markets?, Croatian economic survey, 11 (1), 11-41.

      Wechsler, Andrea; Mueller-Langer, Frank (2009). Ökonomische und rechtliche Analyse der Immaterialgüterrechtsdurchsetzung, Jahrbuch der Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, 2008, 1-5.

      • Die ökonomische Analyse des Immaterialgüterrechts stellt eine wesentliche Verfeinerung der Untersuchungsmethoden der Grundlagen des geistigen Eigentums dar. In der International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI) wurden diese beiden Forschungsstränge mit dem Ziel einer ökonomischen und rechtlichen Analyse der Immaterialgüterrechtsdurchsetzung zu einem neuen Forschungsschwerpunkt verbunden.
      • The economic analysis of the intellectual property law system constitutes an extensive refinement of the research methodology relating to intellectual property rights. The International Max Planck Research School for Competition and Innovation (IMPRS-CI) combines these two most relevant research strands to a new area of research: the economic and legal analysis of intellectual property rights enforcement.
      • http://www.mpg.de/438638/forschungsSchwerpunkt2?c=166446

      Konferenzbeiträge

      Mueller-Langer, Frank (2007). Synopsis of the discussions to Bigus, Jochen and Zimmermann, Ruth-Caroline: "Unabhängigkeit und Regulierung von Abschlussprüfern - Neuere Entwicklungen in den USA, Europa und in Deutschland [Independence and Regulation of Auditors - Recent Developments in the U.S., Europe and Germany]", in: Thomas Eger, Hans-Bernhard Schäfer (Hg.), Ökonomische Analyse der europäischen Zivilrechtsentwicklung, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007, 602-604.

      • Event: X. Travemünder Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Travemünde, 2006-03-29

      Mueller-Langer, Frank (2007). Synopsis of the discussions to Kirstein, Roland and Schäfer, Hans-Bernd: "Erzeugt der europäische Verbraucherschutz Marktversagen? - Eine informationsökonomische und empirische Analyse [Governmental Exposure to Information: The European Information Model in the Light of Behavioral Economics]", in: Thomas Eger, Hans-Bernhard Schäfer (Hg.), Ökonomische Analyse der europäischen Zivilrechtsentwicklung, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007, 417-419.

      • Event: X. Travemünder Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Travemünde, 2006-03-29

      Mueller-Langer, Frank (2007). Synopsis of the discussions to Rehberg, Markus: "Der staatliche Umgang mit Information: Das europäische Informationsmodell im Lichte von Behavioral Economics [Governmental Exposure to Information: The European Information Model in the Light of Behavioral Economics]", in: Thomas Eger, Hans-Bernhard Schäfer (Hg.), Ökonomische Analyse der europäischen Zivilrechtsentwicklung, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2007, 366-368.

      • Event: X. Travemünder Symposium zur ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, Travemünde, 2006-03-29

      Beiträge in Sammelwerken

      Mueller-Langer, Frank (2014). Copyright and Parallel Trade, in: Richard Watt (Hg.), Handbook Economics of Copyright - A Guide for Students and Teachers, 287-310. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

        Mueller-Langer, Frank; Scheufen, Marc (2013). Academic Publishing and Open Access, in: Christian Handke, Ruth Towse (Hg.), Handbook of Digital Creative Economy, 365-377. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.

        • With the spread of the internet and new opportunities for publishing academic works digitally at virtually no costs, the traditional copyright model has recently been put under critical review which is for at least two reasons: First and foremost, a vast increase in subscription prices for academic journals has forced (university) libraries to significantly cut their journal portfolios. Second, copyright seems negligible in academia as researchers are motivated by reputation gains and CV effects rather than direct financial returns from publishing their works. As a consequence, the promotion of Open Access (OA) to scientific research is claimed as the perceived future of academic publishing in the information age. This paper critically reviews the OA debate by discussing theoretical and empirical arguments on the role of copyright in publishing scientific outcomes. A brief historical perspective introduces to the changed environmental conditions for scholarly publishing, pointing to a new trade-off in the digital age. By framing the debate in a broader literature stream and related issues, we provide with caveat for further research and a glimpse of possible future scenarios. It is shown that copyright may be both a blessing and a curse in establishing an effective framework for scientific progress.
        • Auch veröffentlicht als: Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-03
        • Available at SSRN

        Mueller-Langer, Frank; Schäfer, Hans-Bernd (2009). Strict liability versus negligence, in: Michael Faure (Hg.), Tort Law and Economics, Chapter 1 (Encyclopedia of Law and Economics), 3-45. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham; Northampton, Mass. 2009.

        • The purpose of this chapter is to compare negligence rules and strict liability rules and to examine the allocative effects resulting from the application of different liability regimes. It first discusses unilateral accidents, while the more complicated bilateral cases follow afterwards. Each section starts with a discussion of the rule of no liability before moving on to various forms of negligence and ending with various strict liability rules. At the end of each section, there is a discussion on how results change when relaxing specific assumptions. The various aspects are summarised focusing on the question of whether the outcome under a specific liability regime is efficient or not. We also discuss several more specific topics of interest, for example, the information generating consequence of negligence, the allocative effects of various liability rules when agents enter into a contractual relationship, product liability, cases of ‘joint liability’, the impact of uncertain legal standards, and the interaction between liability law and insurance.
        • Available at SSRN

        Andere Veröffentlichungen, Presseartikel, Interviews

        Mueller-Langer, Frank Rezension von: Götting, Horst-Peter/ Lunze, Anja (Hrsg.): Überprotektion durch Geistiges Eigentum? (Does Intellectual Property Rights Cause Overprotection?) Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2009, 235 S., ISBN 978-3-8329-4289-2, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil, 59 (8/9), 771-772.

          Mueller-Langer, Frank Rezension von: Axel Gosseries, Alain Marciano & Alain Strowel (eds.): Intellectual Property and Theories of Justice. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 277 S., IIC - international review of intellectual property and competition law, 41 (2), 247-250.

            Monographien

            Mueller-Langer, Frank (2009). Creating R&D Incentives for Medicines for Neglected Diseases. An Economic Analysis of Parallel Imports, Patents, and Alternative Mechanisms to Stimulate Pharmaceutical Research (Gabler Research: Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts). Wiesbaden: Gabler.

              Diskussionspapiere

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Fecher, Benedikt; Harhoff, Dietmar; Wagner, Gert G. (2017). The Economics of Replication, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 17-03.

              • Replication studies are considered a hallmark of good scientific practice. Yet they are treated among researchers as an ideal to be professed but not practiced. To provide incentives and favorable boundary conditions for replication practice, the main stakeholders need to be aware of what drives replication. Here we investigate how often replication studies are published in empirical economics and what types of journal articles are replicated. We find that from 1974 to 2014 less than 0.1% of publications in the top-50 economics journals were replications. We do not find empirical support that mandatory data disclosure policies or the availability of data or code have a significant effect on the incidence of replication. The mere provision of data repositories may be ineffective, unless accompanied by appropriate incentives. However, we find that higher-impact articles and articles by authors from leading institutions are more likely to be subject of published replication studies whereas the replication probability is lower for articles published in higher-ranked journals.
              • SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Scheufen, Marc; Waelbroeck, Patrick (2016). Does Online Access Promote Research in Developing Countries? Empirical Evidence from Article-Level Data, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 16-14.

              • Universities in developing countries have rarely been able to subscribe to academic journals in the past. The “Online Access to Research in the Environment” initiative (OARE) provides institutions in developing countries with free online access to more than 5,700 environmental science journals. Here we analyze the effect of OARE registration on scientific output by research institutions in five developing countries. We apply a difference-in-difference estimation method using panel data for 18,955 journal articles from 798 research institutions. We find that online access via OARE increases publication output by at least 43% while lower-ranked institutions located in remote areas benefit less. These results are robust when we apply instrumental variables to account for the information diffusion process and a Bayesian estimation method to control for self-selection into the initiative.
              • SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick (2014). Open Access to Research Data: Strategic Delay and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Mandatory Data Disclosure, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, No. 14-09.

              • Mandatory data disclosure is an essential feature for credible empirical work but comes at a cost: First, authors might invest less in data generation if they are not the full residual claimants of their data after their first publication. Second, authors might "strategically delay" the time of submission of papers in order to fully exploit their data in subsequent research. We analyze a three-stage model of publication and data disclosure. We derive exact conditions for positive welfare effects of mandatory data disclosure. However, we find that the transition to mandatory data disclosure has negative welfare properties if authors delay strategically.
              • Available at SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard (2014). The Hybrid Open Access Citation Advantage: How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Fee Buying You?, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, No. 14-02.

              • We study the hybrid open access (HOA) citation effect. Under HOA pilot agreements, HOA is assigned for all articles of eligible authors. We use unique data on 208 (1,121) HOA (closed access) economics articles. We control for the quality of journals, articles and institutions and citations to RePec pre-prints. Performing Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood regressions, HOA turns out to be a significant predictor of citations with marginal effects ranging between 22% and 26%. However, once we additionally control for institution quality and citations to RePec pre-prints, the marginal HOA citation advantage turns out to be insignificant and drops to 0.4%.
              • (Gewinner des “Sloan Economics of Knowledge Contribution and Distribution”- Forschungswettbewerbs 2013)
              • Available at SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Gerstenberger, Michael; Hackinger, Julian; Heisig, Benjamin (2013). A Brief Guide for the Creation of Author-specific Citation Metrics and Publication Data Using the Thomson Reuters Web of Science and Scopus Databases, RatSWD Working Paper Series, No. 228/2013.

              • The objective of this guide is twofold. First, it shall enable interested readers to understand and reproduce the process of collecting author-specific citation metrics and publication data from the Thomson Reuters Web of Science and Scopus databases that is adopted in Andreoli-Versbach and Mueller-Langer (2013). Second, it presents the problems faced during the data collection process and the refined method of data collection we adopt to address related concerns. Thereby, it may serve interested readers as a guideline to accurately and efficiently retrieve citation metrics and publication information from Thomson Reuters Web of Science and Scopus in similar endeavors.
              • http://www.ratswd.de/dl/RatSWD_WP_228.pdf

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard (2013). Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-sided Model, RatSWD Working Paper, No. 223.

              • We analyse optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the (non-linear) externalities between readers and authors in a journal. We show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of highquality journals. Besides, we find that the removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal profits, and may increase social welfare.
              • http://www.ratswd.de/dl/RatSWD_WP_223.pdf

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick (2013). Leading-effect vs. Risk-taking in Dynamic Tournaments - Evidence from a Real-life Randomized Experiment, Munich Discussion Paper, No. 2013-6.

              • Two “order effects” may emerge in dynamic tournaments with information feedback. First, participants adjust effort across stages, which could advantage the leading participant who faces a larger “effective prize” after an initial victory (leading-effect). Second, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the final stage as they have “nothing to lose” (risk-taking). We use a randomized natural experiment in professional two-game soccer tournaments where the treatment (order of a stage-specific advantage) and team characteristics, e.g. ability, are independent. We develop an identification strategy to test for leading-effects controlling for risk-taking. We find no evidence of leading-effects and negligible risk-taking effects.
              • http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15452/

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick (2013). Open Access to Data: An Ideal Professed but Not Practised, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper, No. 13-07.

              • We provide evidence for the status quo in economics with respect to data sharing using a unique data set with 488 hand-collected observations randomly taken from researchers' academic webpages. Out of the sample, 435 researchers (89.14%) neither have a data&code section nor indicate whether and where their data is available. We find that 8.81% of researchers share some of their data whereas only 2.05% fully share. We run an ordered probit regression to relate the decision of researchers to share to their observable characteristics. We find that three predictors are positive and significant across specifications: being full professor, working at a higher-ranked institution and personal attitudes towards sharing as indicated by sharing other material such as lecture slides.
              • Available at SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Jorzik, Nathalie (2013). Multilateral Stability and Efficiency of Trade Agreements: A Network Formation Approach, Munich Discussion Paper, No. 2013-3.

              • We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multi-country settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that the existence of a multilateral trade agreement is always necessary for the stability of the trading system and that the formation of preferential trade agreements is always necessary for achieving global free trade. We also find that global free trade is efficient but not necessarily the only multilaterally stable trade equilibrium when countries are symmetric (heterogeneous) in terms of market size. We derive conditions under which such a conflict between overall welfare efficiency and stability occurs.
              • Available at SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Eichberger, Jürgen (2012). On the Welfare Effects of Exclusive Distribution Arrangements, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No. 12-07.

              • The regulation of vertical relationships between firms is the subject of persistent legal and academic controversy. The literature studying vertical trade relationships seems to assume that an upstream monopolist prefers downstream competition over exclusive distribution arrangements. We derive precise conditions for when an upstream monopolist prefers competing distribution systems over exclusive distribution in the downstream market. We also show that the welfare effects of downstream competition are ambiguous. A downstream oligopoly may have negative welfare properties compared to a downstream monopoly.
              • Available at SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Watt, Richard (2012). Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2012-019.

              • We analyze optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the relationship between readers and authors in a journal. In contrast to previous literature, we firstly show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Second, we find that removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) decreases journal profits but has ambiguous social welfare effects.
              • Available at SSRN

              Mueller-Langer, Frank (2011). Neglected Infectious Diseases: Are Push and Pull Incentive Mechanisms Suitable for Promoting Research?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No. 11-10.

              Mueller-Langer, Frank; Andreoli-Versbach, Patrick (2011). The Absence of 'Order Effects' in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-Life Randomized Experiment, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper, No. 11-08.

              Mueller-Langer, Frank (2010). An Analysis of the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper, No. 10-03 ).

              • The regulation of parallel trade has become a critical issue in the global trading system, as the welfare effects of parallel trade freedom are generally ambiguous. In this paper we investigate the welfare effects of parallel trade freedom for low, intermediate, and high trade costs and different levels of market size. By analyzing a game played between a domestic monopolistic manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and a foreign exclusive distributor we, first, show that parallel trade reduces the profit of the manufacturer and his incentives to invest in R&D. In addition to this first finding, we show, secondly, that the question as to whether parallel trade freedom has positive or negative welfare properties depends on the level of trade cost and the heterogeneity of countries in terms of market size. In particular, we find that parallel trade freedom has a positive effect on global welfare if countries are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of market size and if trade costs are intermediate and low, respectively. Surprisingly, this result even holds in a situation where parallel trade freedom implies the closure of the smaller market. If, however, countries are virtually homogenous in terms of market size, parallel trade freedom may be detrimental to global welfare for specific levels of trade costs.
              • Available at SSRN
              • http://works.bepress.com/frank_mueller_langer/5/

              Mueller-Langer, Frank (2008). An Analysis of the Welfare Effects of Parallel Trade Freedom, German Working Papers in Law and Economics,9. Berkeley, California: Berkeley Electronic Press.

              • In a double marginalization model which is played between a domestic monopolistic manufacturer of pharmaceuticals and a foreign exclusive distributor, I examine the impact of parallel trade freedom on the manufacturer’s profit. I also analyze its impact on global welfare for low, intermediate, and high trade costs and different levels of heterogeneity of the two countries where the manufacturer and the distributor are located. The model suggests that parallel trade – provided that it is a credible threat – reduces the profit of the manufacturer and thus reduces his incentives to invest in R&D. If, however, trade costs are high, parallel trade is a non-credible threat as it is not a worthwhile business activity for the foreign distributor and thus does not have any impact on the profit of the manufacturer. The model shows that parallel trade has positive welfare properties if the two countries are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of market size and if trade costs are intermediate and low, respectively. If, however, the countries are virtually homogenous in terms of market size, parallel trade may be detrimental to global welfare for specific levels of trade costs.
              • http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2008/iss1/art9/

              Mueller-Langer, Frank (2007). A Game Theoretic Analysis of Parallel Trade and the Pricing of Pharmaceutical Products, German Working Papers in Law and Economics,6. Berkeley, California: Berkeley Electronic Press.

              • We develop a simple double marginalization model with complete information, in which an original manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product faces potential competition from parallel imports by a foreign exclusive distributor. The model suggests that parallel imports will never occur in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, as it will always be beneficial for the manufacturer to monopolize the home country by undercutting the price of the reimported pharmaceutical product. However, the question as to whether it is optimal for the manufacturer to charge the monopoly price in the home country depends on the level of trade costs and the level of heterogeneity of the two countries, in terms of market size and price elasticity of demand. For the purpose of further research, this paper suggests the introduction of asymmetric information with regard to local demand functions, in order to explain why parallel trade may actually occur in equilibrium.
              • http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2007/iss2/art6/

              Vorträge

              04.09.14- 05.09.14

              The Hybrid Open Access Citation Advantage: How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Fee Buying You?

              9th Annual Conference of the European Policy for Intellectual Property Association, European Commission

              Ort: Belgien


              23.06.14- 25.06.14

              The Hybrid Open Access Citation Advantage: How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Fee Buying You?

              2014 Munich Conference on Innovation and Competition

              Ort: Schloss Ringberg, Deutschland


              31.03.14- 02.04.14

              Parallel Trade and its Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare

              MPI Doctor Seminar

              Ort:Schloss Ringberg, Deutschland

              Lehrveranstaltungen

              Winter-Semester 2014/2015

              Introduction to Economics

              Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


              Winter-Semester 2013/2014

              Introduction to Economics

              Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


              Spring 2013

              Law and Economics of IP

              Master Programme in Law and Economics, Integration Seminar

              Ort: Universität St. Gallen, Schweiz

              Projekte