Veranstaltungen

On April 15, the European Union sent a statement of objections to Google, claiming - among other accusations - that Google had distorted internet search results in order to support its own shopping service, thus violating art. 101 TFEU.

While this step will certainly bind close attention of both practitioners and legal scholars for quite some years in the Western world, it is of considerably less relevance for the largest national Internet service market in the world- China.

Monopolistic mechanisms applied - and recently prosecuted - can, anyway, be detected in China just as well, and in many respects Chinese monopolists would outperform Google by far. As the Chinese government endeavors to make (and partially also keep already) its Internet industry globally competitive, the antimonopoly authorities keep silent and tolerate the oligopolistic structure of this market since 2010. Still, in fields where the dominance of one company - e.g. "Baidu", the "Chinese Google", in the field of IT-Services - leads to strikingly obvious repression of competitors, recently also in China those voices became louder which called for a stricter regime of antimonopoly control. This paper analyses both economically and legally the challenges of defining a monopoly in the Chinese competition law system at the example of Baidu and provides propositions how to effectively apply antimonopoly law and trigger its enforcement in the Internet industry under present Chinese law.

Since 2011, a chain of cases dealing with alleged infringement of IPR and especially of standards essential patents (SEPs) in the ICT industry have been brought before the High Courts and the Competition Commission of India.

The ICT related cases of interest are : Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Ericsson) v Kingtech Electronics (Kingtech); Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v Mercury Electronics and Micromax Informatics; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) vs. Gionee Communications Equipment Co. Ltd and U T Electronics, Trust Marketing/Akshar Telecom, United Teleservices Ltd., United Telecoms Ltd. and Priyanka Telecom Ltd.[Gionee]; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) vs. Intex Technologies (India) Ltd; Vringo Infrastructure and ANR vs. ZTE Telecom India and ORS; Vringo Infrastructure and ANR vs. Nuage Techsol Pvt Ltd and ANR; Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) vs. Xiaomi Technology & Ors.

The matter related to M/S J.C. Bamford Excavators Ltd. and ANR [jointly JCB] vs. Bull Machines Pvt Ltd addresses another dimension in market related competition especially in the heavy engineering sector. The case related to "Competition Commission of India vs 17 Car Manufacturers in India Case No. C03/2011" is the first case in which various sections of the Competition Act has been put to test by the CCI and the Indian judiciary. The presentation will touch on these cases to highlight the trends in India vis-à-vis the CCI and the Indian Judiciary.

The judgments delivered till date demonstrate the interwoven complexities and the immediate need for a critical analysis of the technicalities and techno-legal interpretations linked to the Indian Competition Act and various laws related to IPR in India.

This paper studies the determinants of investment in legal advice by plaintiffs in patent litigation. A hand-collected sample of US patent litigation cases is used to identify the empirical factors that determine the number of legal counsels employed by the plaintiffs. It turns out that more valuable patents lead to a higher investment in legal advice. Large firms, and plaintiffs with large patent portfolios employ more counsels, whereas individual litigants employ fewer. Software patents are related to a lower investment by the plaintiffs. These findings help not only to understand the cost drivers of litigation but have also important implications for the discussions on software patents, and the role of the litigant status for litigation success.

On February 18th, 2015, the Tokyo District Court ruled that sending a notice to the infringers of FRAND patents stating that the proprietor has the right to obtain injunction would be considered to be a “false accusation” and is prohibited as “unfair competition” by the Unfair Competition Prevention Act Article 2 (xiv).

This decision was based on a preceding IP high court decision on the Japanese “Apple v. Samsung” case on May 16, 2014 which ruled that the assertion of the right to injunctive relief by a patent owner would be considered an abuse of patent rights when the infringer succeeds in proving in court to have been a willing licensee.

This presentation analyzes and discusses the legal and factual implications of the February 18th Tokyo District Court decision, which is an interesting development of the case law concerning FRAND patents in Japan, and the preceding May 16th IP High Court decision on which the Tokyo District Court case is based on. The decision, along with other relevant rules concerning damages in cases of patent infringement in Japan, greatly lowered the enforceability of FRAND declared patents, and is factually shoving the Japanese companies away from FRAND declarations, despite the intention of the court to enhance free usage of FRAND declared patents.

Ms.Yuzuki Nagakoshi is a Guest Researcher at Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition and she is an Overseas Researcher of the Institute of Intellectual Property and Japan Patent Office. She got her Bachelor’s Degree from University of Tokyo (Japan) and Master’s Degree from Tsinghua University (Beijing, P.R.China). Now she is a Doctorate Student of University of Tokyo. Area of her Expertise are Intellectual Property Law, Patent Law, Technology Transfer, Public Policy Analysis.