The project argues that evaluations of optimal antitrust rules ought to fully recognize antitrust
predictability as a relevant factor, which implies a reduction in the role of economics in antitrust
enforcement. The project discusses the differences between the direct and indirect mechanism
of preventing anticompetitive conduct, also known as specific and general deterrence. It moreover
considers the roles assumed by accuracy and predictability of antitrust adjudication within these
mechanisms. While operation of the direct mechanism depends only on accuracy, the indirect
mechanism in addition requires predictability to work well. Since a great majority of
anticompetitive conduct is prevented indirectly rather than directly, predictability is indispensable
for the overall effectiveness of antitrust. Consequently, evaluations of optimal antitrust rules need
to search for the most effective attainable combination of accuracy and predictability, inevitably
sacrificing some of the former for the sake of the latter in the process. Since a greater use of
economics enhances accuracy while curtailing predictability, the optimal extent of using
economics in case analyses will decrease accordingly.