The article examines the institution of joint ventures in the context of competition law. Depending on the strategy of interaction chosen by the parents of the joint venture and the focus on control or coordination relations, joint ventures may generate heterogeneous risks for the competitive environment. They should be investigated and controlled under different procedures: the procedure for controlling the concentration of economic entities or the procedure for controlling concerted actions of economic entities. Guided by the institutional analysis of the methods of market power concentration and the European experience of competition policy (law-making and law enforcement), the authors of the article propose, test and find confirmation of the hypothesis regarding the ability of the criterion of the full-functionality of a joint ventureʼs economic activity to determine the method of market power concentration chosen by its founders and, ultimately, to determine the application of the control procedures corresponding to it. In particular, full-functionality is a sign of the concentration of business entities as opposed to their concerted actions. The introduction of the full-functionality criterion into Ukrainian legislation on the protection of economic competition is, on the one hand, a step closer to the EU acquis, and on the other hand, a way to increase the efficiency of antitrust control procedures. The article also suggests ways to improve further the practice of applying the relevant criterion as a lever for switching the antimonopoly control regimes depending on the method of market power concentration.
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