The Misuse of Political Rights as a Competition Issue
Beneke Avila, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute, argues that companies that have repeatedly attempted to capture a regulatory authority in the past are abusing their political rights. If, in doing so, they push for regulations or their enforcement with anti-competitive effects, they may be sanctioned under EU competition law.
This issue is also relevant outside the EU, and the applicability of the proposal depends on the legal context. In some countries, the legal framework might preclude the enforcement of competition law with regard to political activism; one example of this is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in the U.S. Furthermore, applicability depends on the dynamics of how companies gain access to and influence policymakers and regulatory authorities.
Targeted Intervention Instead of Blanket Monitoring
Beneke Avila argues that corporate political activities should be explicitly addressed by competition law enforcement. If intervention is limited to cases of high risk of regulatory capture, competition policy can balance the legitimate functions of lobbying on the one hand, and reduced market competition on the other.
In this way, competition law enforcement can complement other areas of public policy aimed at preventing market distortions caused by political influence, such as transparency requirements for corporate political activities and state aid regulations. Beneke Avila’s proposal comes against the backdrop of declining competition, as noted in the Draghi Report, as well as increasing corporate lobbying in the EU.
Publication
The article is open access and part of a special issue of the European Law Journal on the role of competition law in economic transitions, organized by Amber Darr and Maciej Bernatt.
Francisco E. Beneke Avila
Corporate Lobbying as Anticompetitive Behaviour in the EU
European Law Journal 32(1), 38–54