Dr. Marina Chugunova

Artikel in referierten Fachzeitschriften

Chugunova, Marina; Luhan, Wolfgang; Nicklisch, Andreas (2020). When to Leave Carrots for Sticks: On the Evolution of Sanctioning Institutions in Open Communities, Economics Letters 191. DOI

• When asked, people dislike punishment institutions, although punishment is more effective than rewards to maintain cooperation in social dilemmas. Which institution do they choose in the long run? We study migration patterns in a laboratory experiment that allows participants to migrate continuously between punishment and reward communities. The majority of participants initially chooses the reward institution, but a substantial number of subjects joins the less profitable punishment community subsequently. In this case, the mere threat of punishment establishes high contributions. Income differences and missing compensations for cooperators in the reward community are the key factors for the decision to migrate.
• Also published as: Working Paper Nr. 2017-09 on the DFG Research Group 2104

Beiträge in Sammelwerken

Bechthold, Laura; Chugunova, Marina; Friess, Svenja; Hoisl, Karin; Rose, Michael (2020). Women in Creative Labour: Inventors, Entrepreneurs and Academics, in: Fundamental Questions. Gender Dimensions in Max Planck Projects 2020.

Diskussionspapiere

Chugunova, Marina; Sele, Daniela (2020). We and It: An Interdisciplinary Review of the Experimental Evidence on Human-Machine Interaction, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 20-15.

• Today, humans interact with technology frequently and in a variety of settings. Their behavior in these interactions has attracted considerable research interest across several fields, with sometimes little exchange among them and seemingly inconsistent findings. Here, we review over 110 experimental studies on human-machine interaction. We synthesize the evidence from different disciplines, suggest ways to reconcile inconsistencies, and elaborate on political and societal implications. The reviewed studies show that people react to automated agents differently than to humans: They behave more rationally, and are less prone to emotional and social responses. We show that there are several factors which systematically impact the willingness to accept automated decisions: task context, performance expectations and the distribution of decision authority. That is, humans seem willing to (over-)rely on algorithmic support, yet averse to fully ceding their decision authority. These behavioral regularities need to be considered when deliberating the benefits and risks of automation.
• Available at SSRN

Chugunova, Marina; Nicklisch, Andreas; Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2017). On the Effects of Transparency and Reciprocity on Labor Supply in the Redistribution Systems, Working Paper / DFG-Research Group 2104, Nr. 2017-19.

• Although taxation distorts work incentives both for taxpayers and transfer recipients, its net effect on labor provision is shown to be less severe than predicted by the theory. It is likely that the reciprocity between taxpayers and transfer recipients plays an important role in mitigating the negative consequences of redistribution and maintaining a high level of effort. To check it we run a series of real-effort experiments exploring the production effects of taxation in the environment with unilateral monitoring: Taxpayers can continuously monitor the effort of the transfer recipient, which is designed to trigger reciprocity. Surprisingly, we find that monitoring decreases the total labor provision: recipients produce significantly less under monitoring, while the production of the taxpayers remains unchanged.
• http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2017-19.pdf

Chugunova, Marina; Nicklisch, Andreas; Schnapp, Kai-Uwe (2017). Redistribution and Production with the Subsistence Income Constraint: a Real-Effort Experiment, Working Paper / DFG-Research Group 2104, Nr. 2017-18.

• A large body of literature demonstrates that redistribution leads to inefficiencies due to distorted work incentives. Yet, this result is obtained under the assumption that people are absolutely free in their labor-leisure allocation decisions and that taxation is merely a wage cut. We challenge this assumption and study labor supply decisions in a framework with the subsistence income constraint and a redistribution system which supports disadvantaged players. The results of the real-effort experiment show that the introduction of the moderate subsistence income requirement causes a substantial increase in productivity among taxpayers, with slight additional boost if tax returns are transferred to recipients and not wasted unproductively. As for recipients, the prospect of receiving a transfer significantly enhances their productivity and spurs the overall efficiency leading to a self-sorting of recipients according to their skills.
• http://bedarfsgerechtigkeit.hsu-hh.de/dropbox/wp/2017-18.pdf