Events

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room E10

In cooperation with WIPO, LES and the Munich IPDR Forum, we will be hosting the 2017 WIPO ADR Workshop on 9 and 10 November 2017. The event will have the character of both an academic conference and an instructional workshop.

On the first day we will discuss general arbitration and mediation issues that have relevance for IP disputes. Among these are, besides the basic procedural processes, topics like arbitrability of IP disputes, competition-law related ordre public concerns and the tension between the public interest in transparent arbitration procedures on the one hand and the interest of individual parties in privacy and confidentiality on the other hand.

The focus of the second day will be on disputes regarding the calculation of FRAND licensing fees for use of standard-essential patents. Standard-essential patents have so far had their greatest impact on the telecommunications industry. In view of the increasing connectedness of the industry, discussed under the key words Internet of Things and Industry 4.0, and the growing degree of automation and digitalization of a wide range of products, such as self-driving cars, standardization will be a topic with even greater fundamental significance in the future. It is established that the owners of standard-essential patents have to make the standard technologies for which they hold exclusive patents available to interested standards users on FRAND terms. What is unclear and controversial, however, is how to calculate FRAND-consistent terms and fees, and how to conduct related dispute resolution procedures. In view of the complexity of the calculation of FRAND licensing fees, the European Commission has made repeated reference to arbitration as a possible dispute-resolution instrument. The Court of Justice of the European Union in its landmark decision of 16 July 2015 (C-170/13, Tz. 68 – Huawei) likewise identifies the possibility of a private-autonomous resolution of disputes, though limiting its statement on procedural design to the vague reference that “the amount of the royalty [may] be determined by an independent third party, by decision without delay”. To promote legal clarity in this economically important area and to provide a contribution to increasing the efficiency of dispute resolution, we are currently, in a series of preparatory workshops, putting together a proposal for guidelines on designing alternative dispute-resolution procedures in conformity with FRAND principles (FRAND ADR Case Management Guidelines). We will present a first draft of the Guidelines at the ADR Workshop.

Contact person: Dr. Axel Walz

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competiton, room E 10

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Researchers’ scientific excellence determines much of the academic reward system including publication output, career promotion and research funding. In this article, we compare different measures of scientific excellence, adding to the discussion on measuring scientific quality and research performance. We construct several author-author text similarity indicators between a stratified sample of scientists and ‘frontier scientists’, which we identify through academic prizes and prestigious third-party funding (ERC grants). We address the question whether high (low) scientists’ similarity (or distance) to the frontier of knowledge provides a valid measure of scientific excellence in comparison to citation counts.

Contact Person: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Are the social norms of basic science and the formal rules of the patent system complementary, or conflicting regulations for innovation? In view of the advancing implementation of innovation as the third mission of public basic science, my study investigates scientists’ motivations to patent, as well as their perception of patent-related research impediments. It does so by means of semi-structured interviews among scientists in German public basic research institutes. The reported motives correspond to strategic motives found in industry, but relate to science-specific incentives. Furthermore, the results indicate that while social norms in science compensate potential research impediments created by existing patents, secrecy caused by the intention to patent can create friction with academic norms for cooperation and knowledge sharing. These results are interpreted to indicate that patent functions and effects are not defined by the patent system itself, but at the multiple levels of governance of the socioeconomic system which utilizes patents.

Contact Person: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

Staged financing of start-ups can be achieved with different investor constellations. One is that companies obtain funding from different investors at different stages. Another is that a deep pocketed investor continues investing in the company across multiple stages, usually as part of a syndicate. The valuation of start-ups is influenced by investor constellations, in particular strategic interactions between outside investors and deep-pocketed insiders. Our theory models the investment choices and valuations of start-ups, deriving advantages and disadvantages of deep pocketed investors. The analysis explains the significance of pro-rata investments, and the role of pre-emptive rights.

Contact person: Felix Pöge

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room 313

To study how governments can improve the quality of patent screening, we develop an integrative framework incorporating four main policy instruments: patent office examination, pre- and post-grant fees, and challenges in the courts. We show that examination and pre-grant fees are complementary, and that pre-grant fees screen more e ectively than post-grant fees. Simulations of the model, calibrated on U.S. patent and litigation data, indicate that patenting is socially excessive and the patent oce does not e ectively weed out low-quality applications. We quantify the welfare effects of counterfactual policy reforms and show how they depend on the quality of the courts (co-authored with Mark Schankerman).

Contact Person: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich, Room E10

Grimm-Zentrum, Berlin