Events

Abstract:

Patent offices around the world face massive backlogs of applications, which threatens to slow down the pace of technological progress. However, economists lack analytical tools to address the issue. This paper provides a model of patent backlog inspired from the traffic congestion literature.

Inventors in the cohort are heterogeneous with respect to desired patent pendency duration and react in anticipation of the waiting time resulting from the backlog. They can accelerate or slow down pendency duration by adapting their filing strategy. We find that the backlog impedes patent examination progress by providing incentives to strategically manipulate pendency.

We discuss three policy responses: increasing examination capacity; introducing a penalty fee; and altering the value of pending applications.

The tenth anniversary of the entry into force of Regulation No. 1/2003 and of the Merger Control Regulation No. 139/2004 commemorates the most significant competition policy projects of the last decade: modernisation, decentralisation and the more economic approach. The project of modernisation has led to enforcement procedures and decisions which exhibit novel characteristics. Decentralisa- tion has expanded the role of national competition autho- rities and has also assigned special European responsibility to these authorities. The more economic approach has laid the grounds for novel strands of arguments. In addition, the tenth anniversary of EU enlargement marks a decade of direct application of competition law in the formerly socialist EU Member States.

Against the background of these major upheavals, the lecture series intends to take a forward looking approach by focussing on the future challenges, necessities and developments of EU competition policy. Central actors of EU competition policy, academics and experts from the legal and economic profession are invited to engage in a critical discourse.

Please register until 18/01/2016 delia.zirilli@ip.mpg

About the Speaker
Luc Peeperkorn is Principal Expert in Antitrust Policy at the European Commission. He studied economics and political science at the University of Amsterdam and worked as an assistant professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam. He was a central figure in various teams which created what is now called the effects-based approach in EU competition policy, in particular by making new rules for supply and distribution agreements, for de minimis agreements and for technology transfer agreements. He also co-authored the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 102. He teaches at the Brussels School of Competition and was recently a Senior Emile Noël Fellow at NYU.

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Im Bereich der wirtschaftlichen Nutzung von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien findet seit einigen Jahren weltweit eine Art „Patentkrieg“ statt. Die von den Rechtsordnungen äußerst schlagkräftig geschmiedeten Waffen in jenen Auseinandersetzungen um Marktanteile und Umsatzerlöse in Bereichen wie etwa Smartphones, Tablet-PCs und Internettechnologien sind Patente, die Schlachtfelder in zunehmendem Maße gerichtliche Verfahren. Es stellt sich die Frage, ob das geltende deutsche Recht, insbesondere § 139 Abs. 1 PatG wegen der im Wesentlichen einschränkungslosen Zubilligung eines Unterlassungsanspruchs noch den verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen an Gesetze entspricht, die den Inhalt und die Schranken des Patenteigentums nach Art. 14 Abs. 1 S. 2 und Abs. 2 GG bestimmen. Es fehlt an einer ausreichenden normativen Vorsorge gegen unverhältnismäßige Beeinträchtigungen grundrechtlicher Belange Dritter bei der Ausübung des eigentumsrechtlichen Primärrechts. Bis zu einer gesetzlichen Neuregelung ist es Aufgabe der allgemein zuständigen Zivilgerichte, im Rahmen patentrechtlicher Verletzungsverfahren und bei der Beurteilung der Unterlassungsbegehren nach § 139 Abs. 1 PatG den verfassungsrechtlichen Anforderungen der gerechten Abwägung nach Maßgabe des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes Rechnung zu tragen.

Einladung zur Veranstaltung

This paper challenges the conventional belief that entrepreneurship is an unstable career path. Entrepreneurship is shown to decrease rather than increase individuals’ turnover tendencies. This finding persists after controlling for lock-in effects associated with sunk costs and unfavorable outside options.

Entrepreneurship is argued to represent a high quality job-match for individuals who otherwise portray above average turnover rates. Arguably, matching emerges from (i) preferences for independence, (ii) skills composition, and (iii) redeployability of human capital into new settings. The counter-intuitive finding – entrepreneurship yields greater employment stability – has fundamental implications for our understanding of entrepreneurship entry and labor market dynamics.