Dr. Mor Bakhoum
LL.M. (Lausanne), LL.M. (Chicago-Kent)

Edited Works

Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law - Towards a Holistic Approach? (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 28), Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg 2018, VI + 577 pp. (together with Beatriz Conde Gallego et al.). DOI

The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2015, XVII + 402 pp. (together with Josef Drexl et al.).

Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2012, XIV + 333 pp. (together with Josef Drexl et al.).

Books and Monographs

Making Markets Work for Africa - Markets, Development, and Competition Law in Sub-Saharan Africa, Oxford University Press, New York 2019, XXI + 221 pp. (together with Eleanor M. Fox).

L'articulation du droit communautaire et des droits nationaux de la concurrence dans l'Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) (Münchner Schriften zum Europäischen und Internationalen Kartellrecht, 13), Stämpfli [u.a.], Bern [u.a.] 2007, XVI + 425 pp.

Contributions to Collected Editions, Commentaries, Handbooks and Encyclopaedias

The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law: Implications for Public Health in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Deborah Healey, Michael Jacobs, Rhonda L. Smith (eds.), Research Handbook on Methods and Models of Competition Law (Research Handbooks in Competition Law), Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA 2020, 312 - 335.

Competition (Law) and Access to Telecommunications Technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: Damien Gerard, Ioannis Lianos (eds.), Reconciling Efficiency and Equity - A Global Challenge for Competition Policy (Global Competition Law and Economics Policy), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York; Melbourne; New Delhi; Singapore 2019, 152 - 172.

Introducing a Holistic Approach to Personal Data, in: Mor Bakhoum et al. (ed.), Personal Data in Competition, Consumer Protection and Intellectual Property Law (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 28), Springer, Berlin 2018, 1 - 4 (together with Beatriz Conde Gallego et al.). DOI

Abuse Without Dominance in Competition Law: Abuse of Economic Dependence and its Interface with Abuse of Dominance, in: Fabiana Di Porto, Rupprecht Podszun (eds.), Abusive Practices in Competition Law (ASCOLA Competition Law series ), Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA 2018, 157 - 186.

• This paper investigates the interface between abuse of dominance and abuse of economic dependence, also known in some jurisdictions as abuse of superior bargaining position. When dealing with abuse-of-dominance cases, although the anticompetitive behavior is directed to competitors (exclusion) or consumers (exploitation), there is a fundamental requirement that competition in the relevant market be affected. This approach does not address relative dominance in cases when abuse occurs without dominance and may affect competition. This happens in situations where a relatively dominant market participant enjoys a superior bargaining position with respect to its business partners and uses this position to its own advantage. Taking the example of the distribution sector, the paper showcases how competition may be affected by an undertaking without a dominant position using a network of contracts. This situation can be illustrated in cases where a network of contracts is created by a relatively dominant firm whose sole objective is to lock in smaller or economically weaker business partners in a network and thereby limit their possibility to shift. Such networks of contractual relationships may hinder not only the economic freedom of the weaker party (vertical dimension), but may also strengthen the market power of the relatively dominant firm (horizontal dimension). As a consequence, the relevant market may be affected although the undertaking does not have a dominant position. Hence, there is a close link between economic dependence, freedom of contract and competition law. Situations of abuses by non-dominant firms are not captured by the requirements that the undertaking enjoy a dominant position and the relevant market be affected in abuse-of-dominance cases. This shows the limits of the concept of abuse of dominance as a legal tool used to protect competition in the relevant market. This paper argues that, in addition to abuse of dominance, there is a potential of using the concept of relative dominance (by sanctioning abuses of economic dependence) to protect not only the freedom of competition of the market participants, but also competition itself.
  
  From a theoretical point of view, the paper wrestles with the concept of abuse of economic dependence from the perspective of the goals of competition law: What does it tell us about these goals. Does it stretch the goals of competition law by taking into account fairness and the protection of the weaker party against the stronger? Does abuse of dominance focus the goals of competition law on efficiency? This discussion on abuse of economic dependence and goals is relevant from an enforcement perspective when assessing the appropriate level of enforcement of competition law. The question of whether competition law is over enforced in cases of abuse of economic dependence is another aspect dealt with in this paper.
• Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 15-15
• Event: 13th ASCOLA Conference, New York, 2018-06-21

TRIPS and Competition Rules: From Transfer of Technology to Innovation Policy, in: Hanns Ullrich et al. (ed.), TRIPS plus 20 - From Trade Rules to Market Principles (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 25), Springer, Heidelberg; Berlin 2016, 529 - 559 (together with Beatriz Conde Gallego). DOI

• The competition-related provisions in the TRIPS Agreement were very much influenced by the context in which the Agreement was concluded. The inclusion of competition provisions served a specific purpose. Competition law was basically seen as a tool to facilitate the transfer of technology. Twenty years after the entry into force of TRIPS, the legal landscape within which IPRs are exercised has experienced tremendous changes on the IP front, as well as on the competition law front. IP protection tends to be raised beyond the minimum standards of TRIPS, questionable protection has been granted specially in the field of patents, enforcement mechanisms and remedies have been strengthened and IP portfolios are strategically used in the markets. From an international perspective, higher IP standards have been exported through bilateral and regional trade agreements. Competition law is developing at a very fast speed, especially in emerging and developing economies. Moreover, competition law and IP laws are increasingly understood as being complementary to each other. A strict and “conflict oriented” reading of TRIPS’ competition provisions does not help to cope with the new strategies of innovation and the new forms of use of IPRs. We argue in this paper that a flexible reading of the competition-related provisions in TRIPS provides enough room for applying competition law as an innovation instrument. Hence, the application of competition law to combat IP-related restraints of competition that inhibit innovation would be covered by the rationale of the TRIPS Agreement just as much as an application of competition law aimed at enhancing access to and dissemination of IP-protected products.

The Informal Economy and its Interface with Competition Law and Policy, in: Josef Drexl et al. (ed.), The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2015, 177 - 196.

Introduction, in: Josef Drexl et al. (ed.), The Economic Characteristics of Developing Jurisdictions: Their Implications for Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2015, 1 - 14 (together with Michal Gal).

Balancing "Incentive to Innovate" and "Protection of Competition": An African Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law, in: Margo Bagley, Ruth Okedeji (eds.), Patent Law in Global Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, NY 2014, 515 - 540.

• Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 13-11
• This paper discusses the interface(s) between IP and Competition Law from a Sub-Saharan Africa perspective. It analyzes the essential facility doctrine raised in the Glaxo Smith Kline case which was settled by the South African Competition Commission against the backdrop of the EU line of case law. This contribution “reopens” the settled case and provides some insights on the legal challenges (and economic implications) that the case would have raised if it had followed the Magill approach with the new product rule for which there is a consumer demand. The EU line of case law seems to emphasize more the need to promote innovation as evidenced by the “innovation surplus” requirement. However, for countries that are importers of technology where local innovation is limited or nonexistent, the “innovation surplus requirement” would be difficult to meet. Access to existing technology or to patented products would therefore be limited. From a consumer-interest perspective of a developing or technology-importing country, access to technology, in some cases, is more relevant than innovation in the first place. In addition to the discussion pertaining to “innovation” and “access”, the paper takes a transversal approach and shed light on the treatment of IP related issues in selected Sub-Saharan African countries competition laws. Suggestions as to how to foster competition law enforcement in IP related restrictions of competition are put forward in the concluding remarks.
• Available at SSRN

IP, Competition Law and Access to Pharmaceuticals: the Relevance of a "Market Approach" to the Exercise of IPRs, Paper prepared in the framework of the 2013 WTO-WIPO Colloquium for Teachers of Intellectual Property, in: WIPO Academy, WTO Intellectual Property Division (eds.), WIPO-WTO Colloquium Papers - Research Papers from the WIPO-WTO Colloquium for Teachers of Intellectual Property Law, WIPO, Geneva 2014, 69 - 75.

• http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wipo_wto_colloquium_2013_e.pdf
• Event: 2013 WTO-WIPO Colloquium for Teachers in Intellectual Property

Introduction, in: Josef Drexl et al. (ed.), Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2012, 1 - 10.

Institutional coherence and effectiveness of a regional competition policy - the case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), in: Josef Drexl et al. (ed.), Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2012, 89 - 115 (together with Julia Molestina).

Reflections on the Goals of Competition Law in Developing Countries, in: Daniel Zimmer (ed.), The Goals of Competition Law, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA 2012, 408 - 440.

• Event: Fifth ASCOLA Workshop on Comparative Competition LawConference held in Bonn, from May 27-29, 2010, Bonn, 2010-05-27

Quelles réformes de droit économique pour le développement de l'Afrique - les défis liés à la prise en compte du social et de l'environnemental, in: Éric Balate, Sévérine Menétrey (eds.), Questions de Droit Économique - Les défis des États Africains, Larcier, Bruxelles 2011, 177 - 195.

Journal Articles

Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, IIC 44, 8 (2013), 878 - 883 (together with Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan et al.). DOI

• For several years, research at the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual
  Property and Competition Law (MPI) - in collaboration with experts from all over
  the world - has examined the trend of bilateral and regional agreements that
  include provisions on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP)
  rights. By building on this research, the following principles
  – express core concerns regarding the use of IP provisions as a bargaining chip in
  international trade negotiations, the increasing comprehensiveness of international IP
  rules and the lack of transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiating process; and
  – recommend international rules and procedures that can achieve a better,
  mutually advantageous and balanced regulation of international IP.
  These principles emanate from several consultations within the MPI and especially
  from a workshop that was held with external experts in October 2012 in Munich,
  Germany. They represent the views of those first signatories and are open to
  signature by scholars who share the objectives of the Principles.
• Institutswebsite

Interfacing the 'Local' with the 'Global': A Developing Country Perspective on 'Global Competition', Concurrences 1 (2013), 66 - 76.

• Auch als: Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper ; No. 13-02
• This contribution was prepared for the “Global Competition Law Conference” held at Chicago-Kent College of Law in October 2011. It retraces the recent developments in competition law in Sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on the situation in West Africa. The legal, political, cultural and institutional dimensions which have influenced the development and effectiveness of competition law in the region are discussed. From an international perspective, the contribution retraces the African countries’ role, if any, in the debate pertaining to a multilateral framework on competition law. The paper shares David Gerber´s view that “Africa has generally played at best a marginal role in global competition law development until very recently, but several factors suggest that that role may increase”. Amongst these factors are the potential derived from regionalizing competition policies in Sub- Saharan Africa and the increased cooperation and technical assistance in competition law enforcement as evidenced by the recently created African Competition Forum (ACF). The proposals put forward in “Global Competition” by David Gerber are also discussed from the perspective of Sub-Saharan African countries. In particular, it is argued in this contribution that the “commitment pathway” proposed there is a beneficial approach for developing countries since it would help them fight cross-border anticompetitive practices through a multilateral agreement. Moreover, the proposal respects the diversity of approaches in competition law and the need of developing countries to conceptualize their own competition law models. The phasing out of the norms on the multilateral level would give also developing countries time to learn and to contextualize their competition policies. The pertinence of a multilateral approach is also discussed in light of the recent developments, in particular the shift toward bilateral approaches in dealing with competition matters.
• Available at SSRN

A Dual Language in Modern Competition Law? - Efficiency Approach versus Development Approach and Implications for Developing Countries, World competition 34, 3 (2011), 495 - 522.

Cohérence Institutionnelle et Effectivité d´une Politique Régionale de la Concurrence: le cas de l´Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), Revue internationale de droit économique 25, 3 (2011), 305 - 332.

Perspectives africaines d´une Politique de la Concurrence dans l´espace OHADA, Revue internationale de droit économique 25, 3 (2011), 351 - 378.

Commerce International, Politique de Concurrence et Accords de Partenariat Economique - Réflexions sur les Enjeux et Perspectives d'un Triptyque, GLOCAL - Revue Africaine sur le Commerce et le Développement 2 (2010), 3 - 7.

Delimination and Exercise of Competence Between the West African Economic and Monetary Union and its Member States in Competition Policy, World competition 2006, 653 - 681.

Répartition et exercise des compétences enre l'Union et les Etats membres en droit de la concurrence dans l'Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), Revue internationale de droit économique 3 (2005), 319 - 354.

Case notes

The Competition Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union finds that Togo infringes regional State aid law by taking actions that favor an undertaking to the detriment of its competitors doing business in the common market (Asky), e-Competitions 52722 (2013).

• http://www.concurrences.com

The Competition Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union finds that Senegal infringes the regional competition law by taking actions that foreclose its national market to competition from Ivory Coast raising issues related to the integration process in West Africa (Norme NS-072), e-Competitions 52723 (2013).

• http://www.concurrences.com

Reviews

Review of: Jürgen Basedow and Wolfgang Wurmnest (eds.): Structure and Effects in EU Competition Law, Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State Aid. Studies on Exclusionary Conduct and State Aid (International Competition Law Series; 47), Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2011, XV + 343 S., 978-90-411-3174-4, European state aid law quarterly 12, 3 (2013), 617 - 619.

Review of: McEwin, R. Ian (ed.): Intellectual Property, Competition Law and Economics in Asia, Hart Publishing 2011, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 368 S., ISBN 978-1-84946-087-3, IIC 44, 7 (2013), 869 - 872.

Review of: Gerber, David J.: Global Competition - Law, Markets, and Globalization, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, XX, 394 S., ISBN 978-0-19-922822-5, IIC 43, 1 (2012), 117 - 120.

Review of: Frison-Roche, Marie-Anne (dir.): Concurrence, Santé Publique, Innovation et Médicament. Collection Droit et Economie, L.G.D.J., Paris 2010, 525 S., ISBN 978-2-275-03505-5, Revue internationale de droit économique 24, 2 (2010), 261 - 264.

Research Papers

Data Governance in Emerging Economies to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals Senegal Country Report Based on the Workshop Shaping Data Sharing Policies in the Agricultural and the Financial Services Sector (Dakar, March 16-17, 2022) (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 24-05), 2024, 91 pp., 28.02.2024 (together with Begoña Gonzalez Otero et al.).

• The report presented here provides a comprehensive analysis of Senegal's current data governance laws and policies aimed at achieving the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It draws from insights gathered during a two-day multi-stakeholder workshop held in Dakar. This workshop was part of the broader international project titled 'Data Governance in Emerging Economies to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals,' which underscores the growing global recognition of the crucial role of data governance in SDG attainment.
  Structured into four distinct parts, the report provides an exhaustive evaluation of Senegal's regulatory landscape concerning data access and sharing (Part I), laying the groundwork for a detailed examination of the alignment of these regulations with SDGs. It then focuses on the agricultural sector's data-sharing practices and their potential contributions to economic growth and sustainable development (Part II), followed by an exploration of the challenges and opportunities in data governance for financial services in the digital era (Part III). Part IV synthesizes the workshop's discussions, offering valuable insights, conclusions, and forward-looking recommendations.
  This scholarly endeavor contributes significantly to the ongoing discourse surrounding data governance and its pivotal role in realizing the SDGs. The nuanced analysis and insights presented herein serve as a valuable resource for policymakers, academics, and practitioners operating at the intersection of data governance, development, and sustainability. Moreover, the outlined recommendations and prospective research agenda provide a roadmap for our future endeavors aimed at advancing data governance in emerging economies, aligning with the vision of the UN AI Advisory Board to govern AI for humanity.
• Le présent rapport propose une analyse approfondie du cadre réglementaire relatif à la gouvernance des données au Sénégal dans l’optique d’atteindre les Objectifs de Développement Durable des Nations Unies (ODD). Il tire parti des informations et données recueillies lors d'un atelier multipartite de deux jours tenu à Dakar. Cet atelier s'inscrivait dans le cadre du projet international plus large intitulé "Gouvernance des données dans les économies émergentes pour atteindre les Objectifs de développement durable (ODD) ». Le projet met en exergue la reconnaissance croissante du rôle crucial de la gouvernance des données dans la réalisation des ODD à l'échelle mondiale.
  Structuré en quatre parties distinctes, le rapport offre une évaluation approfondie du cadre réglementaire du Sénégal en ce qui concerne l'accès et le partage des données (Partie I), posant ainsi les bases pour un examen détaillé de l'alignement des dispositions légales avec les ODD. Il se concentre ensuite sur les pratiques de partage de données dans le secteur agricole et leur contribution potentielle à la croissance économique et au développement durable (Partie II), suivi d'une exploration des défis et des opportunités de la gouvernance des données pour les services financiers à l'ère numérique (Partie III). La Partie IV synthétise les discussions de l'atelier, offrant des perspectives, des conclusions et des recommandations prospectives.
  Cette étude apporte une contribution significative au débat en cours sur la gouvernance des données et son rôle central dans la réalisation des ODD. L'analyse détaillée et les perspectives présentées ici sont une ressource pour les décideurs, les universitaires et les praticiens qui travaillent sur l'intersection entre la gouvernance des données, le développement et la durabilité. De plus, les recommandations formulées et le programme de recherche prospectif offrent une feuille de route pour les initiatives futures visant à faire progresser la gouvernance des données dans les économies émergentes, s'alignant ainsi sur la vision du Groupe consultatif sur l'IA des Nations unies pour une gouvernance de l’IA au service de l'humanité.

Digital Markets, Mobile Payments Systems and Development – Competition Policy Implications in Developing Countries in Light of the EU Experience (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 18-13), 2018, 43 pp. (together with Jörg Hoffmann, Francisco Beneke).

• The digitization of economic activity has important socio-economic development implications and at the same time creates challenges for antitrust analysis. These implications and challenges have been met differently in jurisdictions around the world. In this paper we analyze the different experiences in the EU and developing countries, focusing on mobile payments. We find that this market exhibits special characteristics that need to be taken into account in the analysis of competition conditions. First, it is enabled by mobile telecommunications infrastructure and is offered by network operators, which causes competition in both markets to be closely linked. Second, there are factors, such as the lack of interoperability and geographical reach, that make network effects in this industry different from those present in other platforms. Third, since mobile payments in developing countries serve a niche—the population underserved by mainstream banking—the definition of the relevant market is not straightforward. We propose the criteria to be applied when making such definition. Finally, since mobile payments have associated financial services, there is an interaction between competition and financial stability that needs to be considered.
• Available at SSRN

Étude sur l´Etat de la Concurrence dans l´Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine de 2000 à 2017 (Study on the state of competition in the West African Economic and Monetary Union between 2000 and 2017), UEMOA, Ouagadougou 2018, 123 pp. (together with Amadou Dieng).

Institutional Coherence and Effectivity of a Regional Competition Policy: The Case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper, No. 11-17 ), 2011, 26 pp. (together with Julia Molestina).

• In the context of globalization the shift from the national to the global has become an economic reality and advanced the emergence of regional integration groups alongside regional competition policies. In the same vein, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has adopted a regional competition law, which entered into force in 2003. WAEMU follows a centralized approach to its competition policy, in which the Union not only has the exclusive competence to legislate on anticompetitive practices, but also bears the exclusive decision-making power regarding the enforcement of the law. National competition-law authorities are mainly excluded from the decision-making process and limited to consulting or executive functions. However, the centralized approach is not flawless. The expected reforms in the member states are still pending, the collaboration of national structures and the community is not effective and the regional institutional level, which was supposed to constitute a strong authority, faces severe constraints in terms of resources and flexibility. The regional case law also remains limited. The effectiveness of the community competition law thus far has failed to live up to its expectations. This paper builds on WAEMU’s eight years experience of enforcement as well as other regional integration experiences, such as ECOWAS or the EU, and identifies a certain number of criteria, which should be taken into account when designing a regional competition policy. The so called “competition constraints” are the number of states and the level of integration of the regional market, the fluidity of trade between member states, the respective institutional capacities of the member states and the Union, the existence or lack of a competition culture in the member states and the time dimension. By analyzing the interaction between the competition constraints and the institutional design of a regional competition policy, one can extract certain principles of orientation regarding the applicable substantive law and the distribution of competences. Applying the lessons learned to the case of WAEMU, the insufficient involvement of the national competition law authorities appears as one of the main deficiencies of the institutional framework of WAEMU. Therefore, this paper calls for a “controlled decentralization”, which includes the installation of a new collaboration framework between the regional and the national level.
• Available at SSRN

Etude sur la Révision du Cadre Institutionnel de Mise en Oeuvre des Règles de Concurrence de l'UEMOA, 2011, 250 pp.

Trips, Patent Rights and Right to Health - "Price" or "Prize" for better access to medicine (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper Series, No. 10-07), 2009, 51 pp.

• The interface between ‘patent rights’ and ‘right to health’ has been one of the most hotly debated issues in the international arena in the past years. By recognizing ‘flexibilities’ to the enforcement of patent rights, the TRIPS agreement aims at reconciling the interests of the patent owners with those of the consumers. However TRIPS has been criticized as not being flexible enough for developing countries facing acute health issues. Although the developments in the framework of Doha could be considered a ‘victory’ for developing countries towards improved access to medicine, extrinsic factors to TRIPS, such as the so called “TRIPS-Plus” agreements and the United States political involvement through the “Special 301”, constitute strong barriers to access to medicine in developing countries. Finding a fair balance between patent rights and rights to health in these conditions is not an easy task. In an attempt to reconcile patent rights and right to health different solutions have been considered. The ‘price’ and ‘prize’ ideas are amongst them. The differential pricing scheme is framed on the idea of a differential pricing of patented medicine between developed and developing countries. As to the ‘prize’ solution, it involves a change in the current patent system rationale. Instead of 20 years monopoly, inventors would be rewarded in a form of ‘monetary prize’ depending on the impact of the invention on the improvement of public health. Even though the rationale and the purpose of these solutions are in line with the need of improving the health conditions in developing countries, they both embody intrinsic limits. The ‘price’ solution leaves unsolved the orphan diseases question. As to the ‘prize’ solution, many issues regarding its implementation still need to be addressed. The ‘price’ and ‘prize’ solutions have not been always considered separately. For instance the Medial Innovation Prize Act of 2005, although based on the “prize” idea, left open the possibility of getting a patent. Leaving the door opened to the possibility of getting a patent would render the “prize” idea more appealing to the pharmaceutical industry. This paper discuss the issues of access to medicine with regard to the developments in the international area first, and, second, defend the idea of a coexistence of the current patent system and the reward system in a form of ‘prize’. Neither the ‘price’ nor the ‘prize’ idea ends the patent system. They constitute alternatives aiming at remedying the drawbacks of strong patent protection. Depending on the type of diseases at hand the ‘price’ solution or the ‘prize’ may be more suitable. For instance, the Type I diseases, (diabetes, heart disease, asthma and most non-communicable diseases) according to the classification of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Commission on Intellectual Property, Innovation and Public Health (“CIPIH”), which affect both developed and developing countries, the ‘price’ solution could be suitable. For types II and III diseases (e.g. Tuberculosis, AIDS, and Malaria) which primarily affect developing countries, a ‘prize’ system could give more R&D incentive to pharmaceutical companies.
• Available at SSRN