Artikel in referierten Fachzeitschriften
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research
Revolving Door Lobbyists
(2012). Revolving Door Lobbyists American Economic Review, 102 (7), 3731-3748.
Washington's "revolving door"—the movement from government service into the lobbying industry—is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.