Veranstaltungen

Firms are known to provide information to policymakers, but little is known about the conditions under which that information is used in shaping public policy. We theorize that self-interested organizations can strategically use information that is socially constructed as disinterested—scientific knowledge—to shape the language of policies. We also explore how companies’ degree of self-interest and social ties affect policymakers’ willingness to use such information. Focusing on corporate political activity in the form of voluntary filings of amicus briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, we analyze patent-related cases that the Court considered between 2000 and 2015. We find that firms that cite social science articles in their briefs are more likely to have their arguments reflected in the Court’s opinions. This relationship is positively moderated when the firm’s lawyer has prior clerkship experience at the Supreme Court, highlighting the role of social ties in tailoring briefs to the Court. However, the degree of self-interest negatively moderates the positive impact of scientific information, suggesting that credibility is compromised when firms appear overly vested in the Court ruling.  (with John P. Walsh)

Ansprechpartner: Elisabeth Hofmeister

Eintragung in den Einladungsverteiler und mehr Informationen auf der Seminarseite.

Medical devices are critical to the delivery of health care, but malfunctioning products can pose a threat to patients, necessitating product recalls. In addition to the direct effects of medical device recalls, such as public health protection and negative reputational and financial consequences for the recalling firm, there may be spillover effects on product development. In particular, the vacuum left by the recalled product and its reputational damage may incentivize competing firms to introduce new medical devices to the market. This study examines the impact of serious medical device recalls on subsequent new product development by competitors, as measured by new medical device submissions to the FDA. We compile data from three regulatory databases representing 11,724 new product submissions and 2,647 recalls for 7,208 unique medical device firms over a 17-year period. Using a fixed effect model and institutional features of the FDA’s clearance process, we find that serious recalls increase other firms’ new product submissions in the affected product market. We estimate that a single recall in a product market increases subsequent submissions by approximately eight percent. Moreover, we find that this relationship is attenuated in markets with more competitors. Our results indicate that firms may currently undervalue actions to avoid product recalls, and that the medical device market may be improved by regulatory efforts to enhance transparency in the recall process.

Ansprechperson: Elisabeth Hofmeister

Eintragung in den Einladungsverteiler und mehr Informationen auf der Seminarseite.

How does industrial policy affect technological change? To analyze this question, we focus on a period of unprecedented state intervention: the economic system of Nazi Germany. After 1933, the government not only tightened and introduced market restrictions, such as foreign exchange and domestic price controls, but also subsidized private investment in autarky and armament industries on a large scale. While previous research has focused on estimating aggregate investment in these industries and the extent to which private firms were forced to invest by the state, this paper analyzes the impact of these policies on R&D activities and, consequently, on technological change. To analyze the direction of technological change, we use a newly constructed patent dataset that includes a sample of over 80,200 patents filed between 1928 and 1941. We use these data to analyze three main research questions. First, did the promotion of investment in autarky industries (e.g. fuel production or ore mining) and armament industries increase patenting in the technology classes associated with these industries? Second, do we observe an increase in the importance of state-owned enterprises or military institutions for R&D? Third, do we find evidence of a change in the direction of R&D activities within large firms? 

Ansprechpartner: Michael Rose

Eintragung in den Einladungsverteiler und mehr Informationen auf der Seminarseite.

The workshop will cover the MSI’s three focus areas:

• Digitalization, Strategy and Organization
• Innovation and Entrepreneurship
• Law & Economics of Intellectual Property, Innovation & Digitalization

Like the Munich Summer Institute, the MSI Ph.D. Workshop will focus on quantitative empirical research. In the workshop, participants will present their working papers, receive comments from senior scholars, and discuss their papers with other participants. Participants are expected to have read all presented papers. The number of participants is limited to 12. Discussants will be senior scholars who participate in the Munich Summer Institute’s main conference.

Das Munich Summer Institute (MSI) wird veranstaltet vom Center for Law & Economics der ETH Zürich, der Universität Lausanne, der Cornell University, dem Lehrstuhl für Technologie- und Innovationsmanagement der TUM, dem Lehrstuhl für Innovationsökonomie der TUM, dem Institut für Strategie, Technologie und Organisation (ISTO) der LMU München und dem Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb.

Weitere Informationen auf der Webseite des MSI

Mehr Informationen: https://startupinitiative.maxplanckfoundation.org/start-up-school/

Titel und Abstract folgen.

Ansprechpartner: Elisabeth Hofmeister

Eintragung in den Einladungsverteiler und mehr Informationen auf der Seminarseite.

Mehr Informationen folgen.

Ansprechpartnerin: Elisabeth Hofmeister

Titel und Abstract folgen.

Ansprechpartner: Daehyun Kim

Eintragung in den Einladungsverteiler und mehr Informationen auf der Seminarseite.

Titel und Abstract folgen.

Ansprechperson: Elisabeth Hofmeister

Eintragung in den Einladungsverteiler und mehr Informationen auf der Seminarseite.