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266 Veranstaltungen gefunden.

Seminar  |  27.11.2018  |  12:00

Brown Bag-Seminar: Patents, Trade Secrets and the Diffusion of Artificial Intelligence

12.00 - 13.30 Uhr, Andreas Panagopoulos (University of Crete)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Considering that both patents and trade secrets can promote knowledge diffusion via licensing, we compare patents and secrets on the way they facilitate diffusion through non-exclusive licensing. This comparison is important because AI algorithms are not patentable. Patents differ from trade secrets on the easiness of imitation when licensed to many downstream producers. In view of this, we argue that secrets are better in defending one’s monopoly under the threat of imitation, inducing market failure on the diffusion of AI. We also find a non-linear relationship between patent strength and the diffusion of ideas, i.e., patents of intermediate patent strength are best as diffusion instruments.

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Vortrag  |  23.11.2018  |  18:00

Industry 4.0 and the Patent System

Rethinking U.S. Patent System in Light of Incentive to Share and Proposal of Second Tier Patent System for Open Innovation

Toshiko Takenaka, Hunter Simpson Professor of Technology Law, University of Washington School of Law

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E-10

Falls Sie teilnehmen möchten, senden Sie bitte bis zum 20. November eine E-Mail an elisabeth.amler(at)

Seminar  |  21.11.2018  |  12:00

Brown Bag-Seminar: Optimal Patent Policy for the Pharmaceutical Industry

12.00 - 13.30 Uhr, Olena Izhak (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

We theoretically derive a simple rule for the optimal patent breadth and duration of pharmaceutical patents. The rule requires only data on generic firms’ investments in imitation prior to the expiry of originator patents. We then test the rule using a unique patent level data set from the US. Paragraph IV challenges offer a clear metric of imitation and patent term extensions create the variation in patent term. Using two quasi-experimental approaches and newly constructed data, we document that extending patent length increases incentives to imitate whereas broadening patents reduces these incentives. Our results together suggest that effective terms of new drug patents should be made shorter and delays in commercialization of new drugs should be compensated by increasing breadth.

Ansprechpartner: Felix Pöge

Kartellrechtszyklus  |  19.11.2018  |  19:00

Big data und Kartellrecht – ein Überblick

Dr. Alexander Rinne (Leiter der europäischen Antitrust & Competition-Praxis von Milbank)

Vorab wird im Rahmen der „Aktuellen Viertelstunde“ Frau Dr. Katharina Kolb, Associate bei Milbank in München, über die „Reichweite der Schadensvermutung im Kartellschadensersatzrecht im Lichte der jüngsten Rechtsprechung“ referieren.

Wie immer lädt das Münchner Kartellrechtsforum anschließend zum informellen Austausch bei Getränken und Häppchen ein.

Wir freuen uns auf Ihr Kommen und bitten um Anmeldung bis zum 15.11.2018 bei

Vortrag  |  14.11.2018  |  19:00

MIPLC Lecture Series: Algorithmic Transparency for Governments

Prof. Robert Brauneis (George Washington University Law School)


Governments have increasingly been using predictive algorithms created through the use of machine learning to assist them in making a wide variety of decisions. They consult predictive algorithms about everything from promoting teachers to assigning police patrols, paroling prisoners, and investigating child welfare. When the governments in question are democratic, there must be some way for citizens to hold them accountable for their use of these algorithms, and to consider whether the algorithms are inaccurate, biased, or otherwise flawed. Yet that kind of accountability requires an understanding of how such algorithms are constructed, and requires disclosure by governments of the choices made and the tests performed during such construction.

This talk will walk through the process of constructing a predictive algorithm, and consider the value choices made in doing so. It will then present the results of a study that filed 42 open records requests in 23 states to seek information about six predictive algorithm programs. That study concludes that most governments do not currently disclose enough information about predictive algorithms to enable evaluation of their accuracy and fairness. Publicly-deployed algorithms will be sufficiently transparent only if (1) governments generate appropriate records about their objectives for algorithmic processes and subsequent implementation and validation; (2) government contractors reveal to public agencies sufficient information about how they developed algorithms; and (3) public agencies and courts treat trade secrecy claims as the limited exception to public disclosure that the law requires.

Speaker Bio

Robert Brauneis is Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program at the George Washington University Law School. He is a founding member of the Project Board of the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center. He is also a past President of the Giles Rich Inn of Court and a Trustee of the Copyright Society of the USA, and is an Advisor to the Restatement of the Law, Copyright.

Seminar  |  13.11.2018  |  18:00

Institutsseminar: Ökonomisierung des Lauterkeitsrechts - Eine empirische Untersuchung vor dem Hintergrund des More Economic Approach im Kartellrecht

18:00 - 19:30 Uhr, Philipp Grotkamp (auf Einladung)

Moderation: Victoria Rivas

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E 10

Seminar  |  13.11.2018  |  12:00

Brown Bag-Seminar: The Impact of Financial Resources on Corporate Inventions

12.00 - 13.30 Uhr, David Heller (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

The effects of increases in external funding on firm-level patenting are empirically investigated. Results indicate that the impact of finance on inventive activities is more multilayered than commonly suggested. In fact, changes in the level of funding affect value-relevant characteristics of patents filed. In a quasi-natural experimental setup, staggered and country-specific legislative amendments of the European financial market harmonization during the 2000s are utilized as an exogenous shift improving firms’ access to funding. First, it will be shown that financial integration leads to increased bank lending to ex ante financially constrained firms. Second, it will be analyzed whether affected firms changed their patenting activities. The finding is, that increased funding is associated with more patents in quantitative terms but of lower average technological quality and value. Further, affected firms alternate towards filing fewer explorative (i.e., impactful and generally applicable) but rather incremental patents. By providing new insights on the relation between finance and firm-level inventions, the results therefore suggest that it is important to acknowledge potentially diverse effects arising from improved access to funding.

Ansprechpartnerin: Zhaoxin Pu

Workshop  |  12.11.2018  —  13.11.2018

Workshop: Legal Aspects of SPCs

Workshop für Interessensvertreter der Studie des Instituts zu Ergänzenden Schutzzertifikaten in der EU (auf Einladung)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E09/E10

Weitere Informationen:

Studie und Annexe

Executive Summary

Übersichtsseite zu SPC der EU-Kommission

Urteilsbesprechung zu Art. 3(a) SPC Legislation: An Analysis of the CJEU’s Ruling in Teva (C-121/2017) and a Proposal for Its Implementation im Fall Teva

Kontakt: Roberto Romandini

The Institute’s Study on Supplementary Protection Certificates was published on May 28th, 2018. It examines the functioning of the system of supplementary protection certificates (SPCs) established by EU Regulation 1768/92/EEC on SPCs for medicinal products (now: Reg. 469/2009/EC) and Regulation 1610/96/EC on SPCs for plant protection products from a legal perspective.

The Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition invites stakeholders to discuss the study’s conclusions and recommendations as well as the perspectives for the SPC system and the unitary SPC.

Seminar  |  06.11.2018  |  12:00

Brown Bag-Seminar: Knowledge Spillovers From Clean and Dirty Technologies

12.00 - 13.30 Uhr, Myra Mohnen (University of Essex)

Government policy in support of innovation often varies across technology areas. An important example are climate change policies that typically try to support so called clean technologies that avoid greenhouse gas pollution and hamper dirty technologies that are associated with polluting emissions. At the margin, private returns of R&D investments in different areas should be equalized. Hence, shifting the composition of R&D activities by a policy intervention will only have a meaningful impact on economic outcomes if the external returns differ. This paper compares innovation spillovers between clean, dirty and other emerging technologies using patent citation data. We develop a new methodology to capture knowledge spillovers using the Google’s Page rank algorithm. Exploring a wide range of robustness checks we consistently find up to 60% higher levels of spillovers from clean technologies. We also use firm-level financial data to investigate the impact of knowledge spillovers on firms’ market value and find that marginal economic value of spillovers from clean technologies is also greater.

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Fabian Gaessler

Seminar  |  30.10.2018  |  12:00

Brown Bag-Seminar: Do the Rules Play the Game? SEP License Negotiations Under Evolving Regulation

12.00 - 13.30 Uhr, Justine Bulkaert (Université de Liège)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

The goal of this paper is to analyze whether the policy changes that have occurred in the European SEP licensing regulation affect the way agents negotiate SEP licenses with each other. In fact, the European SEP licensing regulation landscape has gone through three major policy changes since 2009: the Orange book standard (only Germany), the Samsung/Motorola decisions (EU-wide) and the Huawei v. ZTE judgement (EU-wide). Even though these reforms sought the same objective – namely sustaining innovation, healthy competition and protecting consumers from monopoly power – their means are, to some extent, quite divergent. Whilst the first policy change established rather strict conditions on the patent implementers, the second one reversed the situation completely, providing a safe harbour to patent users. In an attempt to clarify the issues raised by such a drastic reversal, the third policy change attempts to reach a balance between the previous two regulations, in order to provide a fair environment to the contracting parties.

We apply a simple Nash bargaining environment to SEP license negotiations in order to study how the changing institutions affect the outcome of such negotiations. By parameterizing policy changes, we are able to see how these alter the disagreement points of the negotiation game and, potentially, define the feasible bargaining range of successful negotiations.

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Fabian Gaessler