334 Veranstaltungen gefunden.

Seminar  |  10.10.2019 | 12:00  –  13:30

Brown Bag-Seminar: Female Inventors and Inventions

Sampsa Samila (IESE Business School)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Does an increase in female medical researchers lead to more medical advances for women? In this paper, we investigate whether inventors’ gender is related to the content of their inventions. Using data on the universe of US biomedical patents, we find that patents with women inventors are significantly more likely to focus on female diseases and conditions. Consistent with the idea of women researchers choosing to innovate for women, we find stronger effects when the lead inventor on the patent is a woman. Women-led research teams are 26 percent more likely to focus on female health outcomes. Our findings suggest that the demography of inventors matters not just for who invents but also for what is invented.

Ansprechpartner: Michael E. Rose, Ph.D.

Vortrag  |  09.10.2019, 18:30

MIPLC Lecture Series: The Economic Efficiency of the Amount of Resources Devoted to R&D

Professor Richard S. Markovits (Texas Law Faculty)

Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, Marstallstraße 8, 2. Stock, MIPLC Seminarraum


Conventional analyses of this issue have three things in common. First, they focus exclusively on the fact that the use of research-discoveries by actors that do not pay for the right to use them causes the profits yielded by industrial R&D of all types to be lower than the economic efficiency of that R&D — in my terminology, to be “distorted” (more specifically, to be “deflated”). Second, they conclude that the non hyphen internalization of the externalities on which thy focus implies that, from the perspective of economic efficiency, too few resources are devoted to industrial R&D of all types (since the associated deflation in the profits yielded by R&D will cause some economically-efficient R&D projects to be unprofitable). And third, they conclude that, for the above reason, R&D-related economic inefficiency will be reduced by tax policies that allow R&D investments to be expensed and antitrust policies that declare lawful horizontal mergers and acquisitions because they lessen competition if the company they created would do more R&D than the participating companies would have done as separate entities. Most conventional scholarship argues that lengthening and broadening IP protection would probably be economically efficient (only “probably” because its authors are concerned that the pricing of IP-protected discoveries might lead to their underutilization from the perspective of economic efficiency).

This lecture makes three criticisms of this scholarship. First, it argues that the profitability of R&D is distorted by many types of Pareto imperfections that the conventional analysis ignores. Second, it argues that, from the perspective of economic efficiency, too many resources are devoted to product R&D and too few to production-process research. Third, it criticizes the conventional R&D-policy recommendations both on the grounds that they do not distinguish between the treatment of product R&D and production-process R&D and on the more general ground that they manifest their supporters’ failure to take account of many of the types of Pareto imperfections that distort the profitability of both of these types of R&D.

Speaker Bio

Professor Markovits has a B.A. from Cornell University, a Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics, a law degree from Yale, and significant training in ethics and jurisprudence. His scholarship focuses on (1) the correct definition of the economic efficiency of a choice, the correct way to analyze the economic efficiency of choices, and the moral or legal relevance of a choice’s economic efficiency, (2) the economic efficiency of particular kinds of government and non-government choices, (3) the useful definition of the intensity of price, quality-or-variety-increasing-investment, and production-process-research competition, (4) the determinants of the intensity of each of these three variants of competition and the different ways in which those determinants interact to determine the intensity of each, (5) the business functions, competitive impact, and economic efficiency of vertical integration and its contractual and sales-policy surrogates, (6) the legality of various categories of business conduct under U.S. and E.U. competition law both as actually and as correctly applied, (7) the structure and content of valid legal argument in the United States, and (8) U.S. constitutional law both as correctly and actually applied. In addition to teaching at Texas Law School, Markovits has taught at 4 other U.S. law schools, in two U.S. economics faculties, in 3 German law faculties, and in 3 German economics or law and economics faculties. From 1981-1983, he was Co-Director of the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at Oxford University and a member of the university’s law faculty.

Seminar  |  08.10.2019, 18:00

Institutsseminar: Protecting Traditional Chinese Medicine in China: In Search of a Modern Concept

18:00 - 19:30 Uhr, Hui Li (auf Einladung)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10

Moderation: Professor Dr. Hanns Ullrich 

Seminar  |  02.10.2019 | 12:00  –  13:30

Brown Bag-Seminar: Disclosure and Cumulative Innovation: Evidence From the Patent Depository Library Program

Martin Watzinger (LMU München)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

How important is information disclosure through patents for subsequent innovation? To answer this question, we examine the expansion of the USPTO Patent Library system after 1975. Before the Internet, patent libraries gave inventors access to patent documents. We find that after patent library opening, local patenting increases by 17% relative to control regions. Additional analyses suggest that the disclosure of technical information is the mechanism underlying this effect: inventors start to cite more distant prior art and the effect ceases after the introduction of the Internet. Our analyses thus provide evidence that disclosure plays an important role in cumulative innovation.

Ansprechpartner: Michael E. Rose, Ph.D.

Patentrechtszyklus  |  20.09.2019, 18:00

Patentrecht in der Krise?

Heli Pihlajamaa, Direktorin der Direktion Patentrecht im Europäischen Patentamt

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Marstallplatz 1, München, Raum E10

Heli Pihlajamaa ist verantwortlich für die Unterstützung der Ziele des EPA durch die Entwicklung, Stärkung und Förderung des EPÜ und der Praxis des EPA einschließlich der Ausarbeitung von Vorschlägen zu Gesetzes- und Richtlinienänderungen sowie die Einhaltung von patentrechtlichen Normen und der Rechtsprechung. Sie berät darüber hinaus das höhere Management des EPA bei patentrechtlichen Fragen. In Ihrem Vortrag wird sie erläutern warum das Patentrecht weder wegen der Künstlichen Intelligenz noch wegen der Biotechnologie in der Krise ist.

Seminar  |  18.09.2019 | 12:00  –  13:15

Brown Bag-Seminar: Catalysts for Gender Inclusion in Innovation: The Role of Universities and Their Top Inventors

Mercedes Delgado (MIT Sloan School, visiting Copenhagen Business School)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Ansprechpartner: Michael E. Rose, Ph.D.

Vortrag  |  11.09.2019, 18:00

MIPLC-Lecture-Series: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence in the Patent System

Andrei Iancu, United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Marstallplatz 1, München, Raum E10


This lecture will cover the growing capabilities and economic impacts of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and its implications for IP policy and law. Moreover, it will explain how the USPTO helps the U.S. to continue leading when it comes to innovation, especially in the emerging technologies of the future, including AI and machine learning.

Speaker Bio
In his role as the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Andrei Iancu provides leadership and oversight to one of the largest intellectual property offices in the world. He also serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Commerce on domestic and international intellectual property policy matters.
Prior to joining the USPTO, Mr. Iancu was the Managing Partner at Irell & Manella LLP, where his practice focused on intellectual property litigation. Mr. Iancu has also taught patent law at the UCLA School of Law and has written and spoken publicly on a variety of intellectual property issues. Prior to his legal career, Mr. Iancu was an engineer at Hughes Aircraft Company.
Mr. Iancu holds a Juris Doctor from the UCLA School of Law. He also has a Master of Science in mechanical engineering and a Bachelor of Science in aerospace engineering, both from UCLA. His full bio can be found at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/executive-biographies/andrei-iancu

Seminar  |  10.09.2019, 18:00

Institutsseminar: Freier Werkgenuss? Begründungsdilemma im Urheberrecht

Ansgar Kaiser (Teilnahme auf Einladung)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Marstallplatz 1, München, Raum 101

Moderation: Laura Valtere

Seminar  |  24.07.2019 | 12:00  –  13:30

Brown Bag-Seminar: Persecution and Escape: The Fate of Skilled Jews in Nazi Germany

Volker Lindenthal (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Ansprechpartner: Michael Rose, Ph.D.

Seminar  |  18.07.2019 | 12:00  –  13:30

Brown Bag-Seminar: Leaning in or Not Leaning Out? Opt-out Choice Framing Attenuates Gender Differences in the Decision to Compete

Nicola Lacetera (University of Toronto)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

In most organizations, promotions often requires self-nomination and entry into competition. However, research on gender differences in self-promotion and preference for competition suggests that this “opt-in” process might result in fewer women choosing to compete. We study whether changing promotion schemes from a default where applicants must opt in (i.e., self-nominate) to a default where applicants must opt out (i.e., those who pass a qualification threshold are automatically considered for promotion, but can choose not to be considered) will attenuate gender differences. In our first experiment, although women are less likely than men to choose competitive environments under the traditional opt-in framing, there is no gender difference when the choice to compete is described using opt-out framing. The increase in participation of women into competition is not associated with negative consequences for performance or well-being. Further, in our second experiment we show that opt-out framing does not entail penalties from evaluators making decisions about whom to hire. These results suggest that organizations could make use of “opt-out” promotion schemes as a behavioral intervention to reduce the gender gap in promotion rates and ascension to leadership positions. More generally, our study provides additional support to the promise of choice architecture to reduce disparities in organizations.

Ansprechpartner: Dr. Marina Chugunova