Francisco Beneke

Doktorand und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter

Immaterialgüter- und Wettbewerbsrecht

+49 89 24246-5406
francisco.beneke(at)ip.mpg.de

Arbeitsbereiche:

Kartellrecht in Entwicklungsländern, insbesondere lateinamerikanische Länder; Innovationpolitik in Entwicklungsländer; Digital Economy in Entwicklungsländer

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang

Seit 2014
Ph.D. Candidate
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München

2012 - 2013
LL.M.
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law

2004 - 2009
LL.B.
Escuela Superior de Economía y Negocios, Santa Tecla, El Salvador

Ehrungen und Preise

Stipendium vom Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb

Mitgliedschaften

Münchner Kartellrechtforum

Publikationen

Aufsätze

Artificial Intelligence and Collusion, IIC 50, 1 (2019), 109 - 134 (gemeinsam mit Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt). DOI

  • The debate over whether, in the absence of overt communications, mere tacit coordination between competitors should be outlawed is neither new nor settled. Current technological developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) have added further complexity to the discussion, which has given rise to many works that explore the effects of the use of AI-powered pricing software on competition. This paper attempts to contribute to the debate by addressing some issues not covered in previous works. First, there are risks to consumer welfare associated with AI pricing software’s capacity to solve uncertainty (for example, supra-competitive equilibria may not be disrupted by changes in demand). Second, the use of artificial neural networks can make detection of anticompetitive pricing patterns more difficult. On the other hand, if authorities can harness the power of the technology themselves, detection problems could be alleviated. Third, the black box argument may not be a problem in this application of artificial neural networks since the pricing software industry has been able to develop more transparent algorithms in response to market demands. Finally, the use of AI pricing software brings some changes to the debate on the feasibility of remedies to mere interdependence, although more work needs to be carried out in this area.

Forschungspapiere

Digital Markets, Mobile Payments Systems and Development – Competition Policy Implications in Developing Countries in Light of the EU Experience (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 18-13), 2018, 43 S. (gemeinsam mit Mor Bakhoum, Jörg Hoffmann).

  • The digitization of economic activity has important socio-economic development implications and at the same time creates challenges for antitrust analysis. These implications and challenges have been met differently in jurisdictions around the world. In this paper we analyze the different experiences in the EU and developing countries, focusing on mobile payments. We find that this market exhibits special characteristics that need to be taken into account in the analysis of competition conditions. First, it is enabled by mobile telecommunications infrastructure and is offered by network operators, which causes competition in both markets to be closely linked. Second, there are factors, such as the lack of interoperability and geographical reach, that make network effects in this industry different from those present in other platforms. Third, since mobile payments in developing countries serve a niche—the population underserved by mainstream banking—the definition of the relevant market is not straightforward. We propose the criteria to be applied when making such definition. Finally, since mobile payments have associated financial services, there is an interaction between competition and financial stability that needs to be considered.
  • Available at SSRN

Market Regulation and Competition Policy – Towards a Dynamic Economy in the Benefit of Consumers, Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association (ALACDE) Annual Papers, University of California, Berkeley 2010, 22 S. (gemeinsam mit Manuela de la Helguera).

  • Despite the many efforts in the advocacy of competition, we find a great difficulty in determining the appropriate mechanisms to introduce this discipline in the assessment of existing and proposed regulation. Many actors in the public sphere in charge of creating and implementing the regulatory regime ignore the great benefits that competition policy brings to society at large. In addition, when there is a certain level of awareness of such benefits, there is no consensus on the level of importance of analyzing market regulation through the lens of competition policy. This lack of consensus may be motivat ed by the fact that it is not easy to quantify the gains of eliminating the excessive restrictions on competition. Finally, some markets continue to be highly regulated for many different reasons, i.e. political and social goals, which can hinder the task of promoting the efficient allocation of resources.
  • https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5s35h94f

Vorträge

21.11.17

Entry analysis in competition law enforcement – Why economic and social development matter

International Seminar Competition Law and Development – A Universal Solution?
Ort: San Salvador, El Salvador


2010

Market Regulation and Competition Policy – Towards a Dynamic Economy in the Benefit of Consumers

ALACDE Annual Conference
Ort: San Salvador, El Salvador