Francisco BenekeDoktorand und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter
Immaterialgüter- und Wettbewerbsrecht
+49 89 24246-5406
Kartellrecht in Entwicklungsländern, insbesondere lateinamerikanische Länder; Innovationpolitik in Entwicklungsländer; Digital Economy in Entwicklungsländer
2012 - 2013
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
2004 - 2009
Escuela Superior de Economía y Negocios, Santa Tecla, El Salvador
Ehrungen und Preise
Stipendium vom Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb
Artificial Intelligence and Collusion, IIC 50, 1 (2019), 109 - 134 (
- The debate over whether, in the absence of overt communications, mere tacit coordination between competitors should be outlawed is neither new nor settled. Current technological developments in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) have added further complexity to the discussion, which has given rise to many works that explore the effects of the use of AI-powered pricing software on competition. This paper attempts to contribute to the debate by addressing some issues not covered in previous works. First, there are risks to consumer welfare associated with AI pricing software’s capacity to solve uncertainty (for example, supra-competitive equilibria may not be disrupted by changes in demand). Second, the use of artificial neural networks can make detection of anticompetitive pricing patterns more difficult. On the other hand, if authorities can harness the power of the technology themselves, detection problems could be alleviated. Third, the black box argument may not be a problem in this application of artificial neural networks since the pricing software industry has been able to develop more transparent algorithms in response to market demands. Finally, the use of AI pricing software brings some changes to the debate on the feasibility of remedies to mere interdependence, although more work needs to be carried out in this area.
Ohio v. American Express and the Balancing of Consumer Welfare Effects on Multiple Sides of a Platform - Sherman Act, § 1, IIC 50, 7 (2019), 917 - 927. DOI
- In Ohio v. American Express Co. the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that in the case of transaction platforms, a single relevant market must be defined, where both sides of the platform simultaneously consume the same good, namely, a transaction. Therefore, a plaintiff must show net overall harm to all sides of the market to satisfy its prima facie burden of proof. This case note argues that this rule is ill-suited to distinguish between procompetitive behavior and exercises of market power that can be justified with mere wealth transfers from one side of the market to the other. In line with an alternative allocation of the burden of proof proposed in the literature, this case note proposes a standard for evaluating countervailing benefits on all sides of the platform. Finally, the case note explains why the Court’s analysis of the effects of the anti-steering provisions was based on faulty economic grounds and the cherry-picking of facts on the record developed at the district court.
Technical Aspects of Artificial Intelligence: An Understanding from an Intellectual Property Law Perspective (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 19-13), 2019, 15
- The present Q&A paper aims at providing an overview of artificial intelligence with a special focus on machine learning as a currently predominant subfield thereof. Machine learning-based applications have been discussed intensely in legal scholarship, including in the field of intellectual property law, while many technical aspects remain ambiguous and often cause confusion. This text was drafted by the Research Group on the Regulation of the Digital Economy of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in the pursuit of understanding the fundamental characteristics of artificial intelligence, and machine learning in particular, that could potentially have an impact on intellectual property law. As a background paper, it provides the technological basis for the Group’s ongoing research relating thereto. The current version summarises insights gained from background literature research, interviews with practitioners and a workshop conducted in June 2019 in which experts in the field of artificial intelligence participated.
- Available at SSRN
Digital Markets, Mobile Payments Systems and Development – Competition Policy Implications in Developing Countries in Light of the EU Experience (Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 18-13), 2018, 43
- The digitization of economic activity has important socio-economic development implications and at the same time creates challenges for antitrust analysis. These implications and challenges have been met differently in jurisdictions around the world. In this paper we analyze the different experiences in the EU and developing countries, focusing on mobile payments. We find that this market exhibits special characteristics that need to be taken into account in the analysis of competition conditions. First, it is enabled by mobile telecommunications infrastructure and is offered by network operators, which causes competition in both markets to be closely linked. Second, there are factors, such as the lack of interoperability and geographical reach, that make network effects in this industry different from those present in other platforms. Third, since mobile payments in developing countries serve a niche—the population underserved by mainstream banking—the definition of the relevant market is not straightforward. We propose the criteria to be applied when making such definition. Finally, since mobile payments have associated financial services, there is an interaction between competition and financial stability that needs to be considered.
- Available at SSRN
Market Regulation and Competition Policy – Towards a Dynamic Economy in the Benefit of Consumers, Latin American and Caribbean Law and Economics Association (ALACDE) Annual Papers, University of California, Berkeley 2010, 22
- Despite the many efforts in the advocacy of competition, we find a great difficulty in determining the appropriate mechanisms to introduce this discipline in the assessment of existing and proposed regulation. Many actors in the public sphere in charge of creating and implementing the regulatory regime ignore the great benefits that competition policy brings to society at large. In addition, when there is a certain level of awareness of such benefits, there is no consensus on the level of importance of analyzing market regulation through the lens of competition policy. This lack of consensus may be motivat ed by the fact that it is not easy to quantify the gains of eliminating the excessive restrictions on competition. Finally, some markets continue to be highly regulated for many different reasons, i.e. political and social goals, which can hinder the task of promoting the efficient allocation of resources.
Entry analysis in competition law enforcement – Why economic and social development matter
International Seminar Competition Law and Development – A Universal Solution?
Ort: San Salvador, El Salvador
Market Regulation and Competition Policy – Towards a Dynamic Economy in the Benefit of Consumers
ALACDE Annual Conference
Ort: San Salvador, El Salvador