Presentation  |  06/13/2025, 02:00 PM

Bioinked Boundaries: Is 3D Bioprinting Innovation Falling Down at the Patentability Hurdle?

Pratap Devarapalli, Ph.D. (TC Bernie School of Law, University of Queensland, Australia)


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max.Str. 4, Munich

Pratap Devarapalli, Ph.D., Postdoctoral Fellow, TC Bernie School of Law, University of Queensland, Australia, who visited the Institute as a guest researcher in 2024 , will present his recently published book Bioinked Boundaries – Patenting 3D Bioprinted Tissues, Organs and Bioinks: An US, European and Australian Patent Law Perspective.

In his talk Dr. Devarapalli will especially emphasize the EU perspective.


Moderation: Prof. Dr. Hanns Ullrich


Abstract:
3D bioprinting, a technology that allows for the creation of human tissues and, potentially, entire organs, stands at the cutting edge of innovation in the life sciences. Three-dimensional bioprinting involves the use of bioinks, composed of living stem cells, to print complex organic structures layer by layer, mimicking the architecture of biological tissues. The implications for industrial applications are varied and the potential financial impact and human benefit are staggering. For example, in medicine bioprinted tissues could revolutionise drug testing, eliminate the need for animal models, and aim to offer solutions to the global organ shortage. Bioprinted tissues, much like genetically modified organisms, involve both natural materials and human intervention. However, as with many biotechnological advancements, the legal questions that surround bioprinting  are equally complex. Can a tissue printed from living cells be considered an invention? How much modification is required to transform a biological material into something that qualifies as patentable subject matter? And how should courts and patent offices balance the need to protect innovation with the need to ensure public access to important medical technologies?


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Seminar  |  06/04/2025 | 03:00 PM  –  04:15 PM

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: Third-party Rent Extraction in the Shadow of Conflict

Alexander Usvitskiy (Higher School of Economics, Moscow)


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max-Str. 4, Munich
Room 342 (internal)

In this paper we study alliance formation and non-formation by presenting a model involving two rivals and a third, neutral, player acting as a buffer. Such player may join one of the rivals or stay neutral in our infinitely repeated game with a stochastic conflict between the rivals. Our main goal is to study under what conditions the neutral player would be willing to pay one of the rivals to join and under what conditions the neutral player would extract rents – receive payments from the rivals for agreeing to stay neutral. We characterize all families of symmetric equilibria and study the corresponding comparative statics. For a low conflict probability, the rivals effectively cooperative, in which case the neutral player extracts rents. As the conflict probability increases, the rivals start competing in an attempt to convince the neutral player to join. Lastly, for a high conflict probability, the neutral player seeks to join an alliance even if it requires paying a fee to a rival.


Contact person: Marina Chugunova


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Munich Summer Institute (MSI)
Conference  |  05/26/2025, 04:00 PM  –  05/28/2025, 04:15 PM

Munich Summer Institute 2025

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max-Str. 4, Auditorium

The Munich Summer Institute (MSI) is hosted by the Center for Law & Economics at ETH Zurich, University of Lausanne, Cornell University, the Chair for Technology and Innovation Management at TUM, the Chair for Economics of Innovation at TUM, the Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization (ISTO) at the LMU Munich and the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition.


Further information on the website of the MSI.

Logo Munich Summer Institute
Workshop  |  05/26/2025 | 08:30 AM  –  03:00 PM

MSI Ph.D. Workshop 2025

LMU, Ludwigstr. 28 (Front Building), Room 211b

The workshop will cover the MSI’s three focus areas:

  • Digitalization, Strategy and Organization
  • Innovation and Entrepreneurship
  • Law & Economics of Intellectual Property, Innovation & Digitalization


Like the Munich Summer Institute, the MSI Ph.D. Workshop will focus on quantitative empirical research. In the workshop, participants will present their working papers, receive comments from senior scholars, and discuss their papers with other participants. The number of participants is limited. Discussants will be senior scholars who participate in the Munich Summer Institute’s main conference.


Program

Seminar  |  05/21/2025 | 03:00 PM  –  04:15 PM

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: Industrial Policy and Technological Change in Nazi Germany

Alexander Donges (University of Mannheim)


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max-Str. 4, Munich
hybrid (Auditorium/Zoom)

How does industrial policy affect technological change? To analyze this question, we focus on a period of unprecedented state intervention: the economic system of Nazi Germany. After 1933, the government not only tightened and introduced market restrictions, such as foreign exchange and domestic price controls, but also subsidized private investment in autarky and armament industries on a large scale. While previous research has focused on estimating aggregate investment in these industries and the extent to which private firms were forced to invest by the state, this paper analyzes the impact of these policies on R&D activities and, consequently, on technological change. To analyze the direction of technological change, we use a newly constructed patent dataset that includes a sample of over 80,200 patents filed between 1928 and 1941. We use these data to analyze three main research questions. First, did the promotion of investment in autarky industries (e.g. fuel production or ore mining) and armament industries increase patenting in the technology classes associated with these industries? Second, do we observe an increase in the importance of state-owned enterprises or military institutions for R&D? Third, do we find evidence of a change in the direction of R&D activities within large firms? 


Contact person: Michael Rose


Subscription to the invitation mailing list and more information on the seminar page.

Seminar  |  05/19/2025 | 03:00 PM  –  04:15 PM

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: Micro-Foundations of Absorptive Capacity as Revealed by Inventor Deaths

Lee Fleming (UC Berkeley)


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max-Str. 4, Munich
hybrid (Room 342/Zoom)

We return to the theoretical foundations of absorptive capacity and test the idea that personal experience in a field makes it easier for firms’ inventors to recognize and build upon local knowledge spillovers from other firms in that field. We propose a new empirical model of localized knowledge diffusion, which 1) measures a firm’s absorptive capacity by its inventors’ prior experience in a field, 2) uses a death instrument to exogenously vary the availability of knowledge of the same collaborative patent in different regions, and 3)estimates the difference in citation likelihood from all subsequent inventors across both regions, as a function of a potentially citing inventor’s prior experience in the field. Consistent with the original theory, firms whose inventors have prior experience in a field are more likely to use locally available spillovers from other firms. No such localization occurs for within firm knowledge diffusion. The effects are stronger for collaborative inventors and more recent knowledge.  (with Benjamin Balsmeier and Sonja Lück)


Contact person: Marina Chugunova


Subscription to the invitation mailing list and more information on the seminar page.

Seminar  |  05/14/2025 | 03:00 PM  –  04:15 PM

Innovation & Entrepreneurship: Do Product Safety Issues Drive Innovation? The Effect of Medical Device Recalls on Market Dynamics

Ariel D. Stern (Hasso Plattner Institute)


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max-Str. 4, Munich
hybrid (Room 342/Zoom)

Medical devices are critical to the delivery of health care, but malfunctioning products can pose a threat to patients, necessitating product recalls. In addition to the direct effects of medical device recalls, such as public health protection and negative reputational and financial consequences for the recalling firm, there may be spillover effects on product development. In particular, the vacuum left by the recalled product and its reputational damage may incentivize competing firms to introduce new medical devices to the market. This study examines the impact of serious medical device recalls on subsequent new product development by competitors, as measured by new medical device submissions to the FDA. We compile data from three regulatory databases representing 11,724 new product submissions and 2,647 recalls for 7,208 unique medical device firms over a 17-year period. Using a fixed effect model and institutional features of the FDA’s clearance process, we find that serious recalls increase other firms’ new product submissions in the affected product market. We estimate that a single recall in a product market increases subsequent submissions by approximately eight percent. Moreover, we find that this relationship is attenuated in markets with more competitors. Our results indicate that firms may currently undervalue actions to avoid product recalls, and that the medical device market may be improved by regulatory efforts to enhance transparency in the recall process.


Contact person: Elisabeth Hofmeister


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Seminar  |  05/07/2025 | 03:00 PM  –  04:15 PM

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: Corporate Political Activity at the U.S. Supreme Court – Self-Interested Organizations Arguing with Scientific Information

Elie Sung (HEC Paris)


Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Herzog-Max-Str. 4, Munich
hybrid (Room 342/Zoom)

Firms are known to provide information to policymakers, but little is known about the conditions under which that information is used in shaping public policy. We theorize that self-interested organizations can strategically use information that is socially constructed as disinterested—scientific knowledge—to shape the language of policies. We also explore how companies’ degree of self-interest and social ties affect policymakers’ willingness to use such information. Focusing on corporate political activity in the form of voluntary filings of amicus briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, we analyze patent-related cases that the Court considered between 2000 and 2015. We find that firms that cite social science articles in their briefs are more likely to have their arguments reflected in the Court’s opinions. This relationship is positively moderated when the firm’s lawyer has prior clerkship experience at the Supreme Court, highlighting the role of social ties in tailoring briefs to the Court. However, the degree of self-interest negatively moderates the positive impact of scientific information, suggesting that credibility is compromised when firms appear overly vested in the Court ruling.  (with John P. Walsh)


Contact person: Elisabeth Hofmeister


Subscription to the invitation mailing list and more information on the seminar page.

Seminar  |  04/09/2025 | 03:00 PM  –  04:15 PM

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: Generative AI and the Nature of Work

Frank Nagle (Harvard Business School)


Virtual talk, on invitation, see seminar page

Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) technology demonstrate considerable potential to complement human capital intensive activities. While an emerging literature documents wide-ranging productivity effects of AI, relatively little attention has been paid to how AI might change the nature of work itself. How do individuals, especially those in the knowledge economy, adjust how they work when they start using AI? Using the setting of open source software, we study individual level effects that AI has on task allocation. We exploit a natural experiment arising from the deployment of GitHub Copilot, a generative AI code completion tool for software developers. Leveraging millions of work activities over a two year period, we use a program eligibility threshold to investigate the impact of AI technology on the task allocation of software developers within a quasi-experimental regression discontinuity design. We find that having access to Copilot induces such individuals to shift task allocation towards their core work of coding activities and away from non-core project management activities. We identify two underlying mechanisms driving this shift - an increase in autonomous rather than collaborative work, and an increase in exploration activities rather than exploitation. The main effects are greater for individuals with relatively lower ability. Overall, our estimates point towards a large potential for AI to transform work processes and to potentially flatten organizational hierarchies in the knowledge economy.


Contact person: Cheng Li


Subscription to the invitation mailing list and more information on the seminar page.