Tagung  |  02.06.2020, 09:00  –  04.06.2020, 18:00

Munich Summer Institute 2020

Aufgrund der derzeitigen Situation wird das MSI 2020 abgesagt. Das Munich Summer Institute 2021 findet von 7. bis 9. Juni 2021 statt.

From 2 to 4 June 2020, the Center for Law & Economics at ETH Zurich, the Chair for Technology and Innovation Management at TUM, the Institute for Strategy, Technology and Organization at LMU Munich and the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition will jointly organize the fifth Munich Summer Institute.

The Summer Institute will focus on three areas:

The goal of the Munich Summer Institute is to stimulate a rigorous in-depth discussion of a select number of research papers and to strengthen the interdisciplinary international research community in these areas. Researchers in economics, law, management and related fields at all stages of their career (from Ph.D. students to full professors) may attend the Munich Summer Institute as presenters in a plenary or a poster session, as discussants or as attendants. The Munich Summer Institute will feature three keynote lectures, 18 plenary presentations and a daily poster session (including a poster slam). Paper presentations will be grouped by topics, not discipline or method. The Munich Summer Institute will be held at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities in the heart of Munich. Participation is by invitation only. The organizers will fund travel and hotel expenses for all plenary speakers and hotel expenses for all poster presenters and invited discussants.

Keynote speakers are:

Paper submission procedure

Researchers who would like to present a paper are invited to submit their paper online until 29 February 2020, at  http://editorialexpress.com/conference/msi2020. The Munich Summer Institute only considers papers which have not been published or accepted for publication at the date of submission. Paper selections will be announced in early April 2020. The program of the Munich Summer Institute will be available in early May 2020. Final papers will be made available to conference participants on a public website, and are due on 1 May 2020. Researchers who would like to attend the Munich Summer Institute without giving a presentation should contact one of the organizers by 1 May 2020.

Further information

More information is available at the MSI website. Any questions concerning the Munich Summer Institute should be directed to Stefan Bechtold, Jörg Claussen, Dietmar Harhoff, Joachim Henkel, Hanna Hottenrott or Tobias Kretschmer.

Workshop  |  23.04.2020, 09:00  –  24.04.2020, 17:00

The 14th Workshop on The Organisation, Economics and Policy of Scientific Research

[Veranstaltung bis auf Weiteres vertagt]

Das Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, die Technische Universität München und BRICK, Collegio Carlo Alberto, organisieren den jährlichen Workshop “The Organisation, Economics and Policy of Scientific Research”.

[Veranstaltung bis auf Weiteres vertagt]

Zur Workshop-Webseite

Tagung  |  24.03.2020, 10:00  –  26.03.2020, 17:00

Smart IP for Latin America – Congreso Anual 2020

Inacayal, Argentinien

[Veranstaltung bis auf Weiteres vertagt]

Veranstalter: Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Universität Buenos Aires (UBA)

Seminar  |  23.03.2020, 08:00  –  01.08.2020, 08:00

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar:

Ab Mitte März sind alle Seminare bis auf Weiteres ausgesetzt und werden auf einen späteren Zeitpunkt verschoben.

Seminar  |  11.03.2020 | 18:00  –  19:30

Institutsseminar: Second Medical Use Patents in Personalised Medicine

Laura Valtere (auf Einladung)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10

Moderation: Aaron Stumpf

Seminar  |  11.03.2020 | 12:00  –  13:30

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: How Do Nascent Social Entrepreneurs Respond to Rewards? A Field Experiment on Motivations in a Grant Competition

Marieke Huysentruyt (HEC)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

We conducted a field experiment to identify the causal effects of extrinsic incentive cues on the sorting and performance of nascent social entrepreneurs. The experiment, carried out with one of the United Kingdom's largest support agencies for social entrepreneurs, encouraged 431 nascent social entrepreneurs to submit a full application for a grant competition that provides cash and in-kind mentorship support through a one-time mailing sent by the agency. The applicants were randomly assigned to one of three groups: one group received a standard mailing that emphasized the intrinsic incentives of the program, or the opportunity to do good (Social treatment), and the other two groups received a mailing that instead emphasized the extrinsic incentives - either the financial rewards (Cash treatment) or the in-kind rewards (Support treatment). Our results show that an emphasis on extrinsic incentives strongly affects who applies for the grant and consequently the type of submissions received. The extrinsic reward cues "crowded out" the more prosocial candidates, leading fewer candidates to apply and fewer applicants targeting disadvantaged groups. Importantly, while the full applications submitted by candidates in the extrinsic incentives groups were more successful in receiving the grant, their social enterprises were less likely to be successful at the end of the one-year grant period. Our results highlight the critical role of intrinsic motives to the selection and performance of social enterprises and suggest that using extrinsic incentives to promote the development of successful social enterprises may backfire in the longer run. (Joint work with Ina Ganguli and Chloé Le Coq)

Ansprechpartnerin: Dr. Marina Chugunova

Seminar  |  17.02.2020 | 12:00  –  13:30

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: Are Women Less Effective Leaders Than Men?

Lea Heursen (HU Berlin)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

Despite increasing gender equality across many domains women remain underrepresented in leading positions. In two experiments, we study whether one reason for this gender gap may be that women are less effective in eliciting coordinated support from followers. Both experiments use coordination games, in which a leader must convince followers to select a particular equilibrium. Our first experiment employs a widely used paradigm to study leader effectiveness, the minimum-effort coordination game, while the second uses a novel game to more directly compare the strength of requests from male versus female leaders. While we find, using explicit and implicit attitude measures, that our participants possess stereotypical associations between gender and leadership, we find no evidence that such bias impacts actual leadership performance. We show that this absence of an effect is surprising, relative to the priors of expert researchers (joint work with Eva Ranehill and Roberto Weber).

Ansprechpartnerin: Dr. Marina Chugunova

Workshop  |  13.02.2020, 14:00  –  14.02.2020, 16:30

Workshop Geographical Indications

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10 (auf Einladung)

Obwohl die Bedeutung Geographischer Herkunftsangaben (englisch: Geographical Indication, GI) in jüngster Zeit mehr Aufmerksamkeit bekommt, gibt es bislang wenig einschlägige Forschung zu dem Thema. Daher hat das Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb Anfang des Jahres 2019 ein Forschungsprojekt gestartet, dessen Zielsetzung in einer Gesamtbewertung der GI-Regelungen in der EU zum Schutz von Agrarerzeugnissen und Lebensmitteln liegt.

Im Rahmen eines zweitägigen Workshops im Februar 2020 wird das Forschungsteam seine zentralen Forschungsergebnisse ausgewählten Teilnehmern aus Wissenschaft, Verwaltung und Praxis vorstellen um damit der Debatte um GIs neue Impulse zu geben.

Seminar  |  12.02.2020 | 12:00  –  13:30

Innovation & Entrepreneurship Seminar: International Spillovers Between Patent Examination Results – Evidence From Rejection Citations at the Trilateral Offices

Tetsuo Wada (Gakushuin University)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, München, Raum 313

When international patent applications are examined sequentially at different patent offices, examiners at following offices may be able to take advantage on the earlier results provided by another office. By way of focusing on rejection citations added by examiners for a set of triadic patent families, this study examines the influence (spillover) of patent examinations across patent offices. Variations over examiners as well as outcome on the applicants’ responses to the examiner disposals will be discussed.

Ansprechpartner: Michael E. Rose

Seminar  |  11.02.2020 | 18:00  –  19:30

Institutsseminar: Good Artists Copy, Great Artists Steal – Hip-Hop as a Matter of Reproduction

Aaron Stumpf (auf Einladung)

Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb, Raum E10

Moderation: Tobias Endrich-Laimböck