Marco Kleine

Dr. Marco Kleine

Senior Research Fellow

Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research

+49 89 24246-581
marco.kleine(at)ip.mpg.de

Arbeitsbereiche:

Organisation und Innovation, Innovationsforschung, Strategisches Management, Verhaltens- und Experimentalökonomik, Entrepreneurship

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang

Seit 2014
Senior Research Fellow am Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb (Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research)

2018 - 2019
Professor für Strategische Unternehmensführung an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (Vertretungsprofessur)

2011 - 2014
Stipendiat am Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern in Bonn, Mitglied der Max Planck Research School "IMPRS Uncertainty" und Doktorand an der Universität Jena

09/2013 - 12/2013
Forschungsaufenthalt an der University of California, San Diego (Rady School of Management)

2008 - 2010
Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre (M.Sc.) an der Universität Bonn

2006 - 2008
Vertriebs- und Projektkaufmann für internationale Projekte bei der Siemens AG in Braunschweig

2003 - 2007
Studium der Betriebswirtschaftslehre (B.A.) an der Fachhochschule für Wirtschaft Berlin

2003 - 2006
Ausbildung zum Industriekaufmann bei der Siemens AG in Berlin, Braunschweig, Erlangen, München und Santiago de Chile

Mitgliedschaften

Collaborative Research Center (CRC) TRR 190 Rationality and Competition 2017 - 2020

Innovation Growth Lab Research Network

Economics Science Association

Academy of Management

Strategic Management Society

Publikationen

Artikel in referierten Fachzeitschriften

Heite, Jonas; Rosendahl Huber, Laura; Kleine, Marco (2020). Subsidized R&D Collaboration: The Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Activity & Performance, Academy of Management Proceedings, 2020 (1), 2020 (1)7665abstract. DOI

  • We study the causal effect of subsidized R&D collaboration on innovation performance. In particular, we make use of a randomized controlled trial to analyze the effect of an innovation voucher scheme in the United Kingdom that grants small and medium-sized enterprises financial support of up to 5,000 GBP for engaging the services of experts, e.g., from universities, research institutes or IP advisors, when pursuing an innovation-related project. Our findings provide evidence that the innovation voucher program successfully accelerates the execution of R&D projects with short-term effects on innovation outcomes. We find that being awarded a voucher has a positive short-term impact on product development for firms that collaborated with a university. In addition, we find a positive effect on the number of patent applications for firms indicating to be in need for specialist IP knowledge. In terms of collaboration outcomes, we can show that subsidized university-industry collaborations result in an increase of joint ventures two years after the voucher has been awarded."
  • Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 20-11

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia (2017). How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision-makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 143, 241-253. DOI

  • This paper studies how participation in decision procedures affects people’s reactions to the deciding authority. In our economic experiment, having voice, i.e., the opportunity to state one’s opinion prior to a decision, significantly increases subordinates’ subsequent kindness towards the authority. These positive effects occur irrespectively of the decisions’ content. The experimental findings stress the positive effects of voice when subordinates and authorities interact. Our results suggest that in organizations, but also in the legal and political arena, participative decision-making can be used to guide people’s actions after decisions have been made.
  • Also published at SSRN as: MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2013/11

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia (2016). Fairness and Persuasion: How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making, Economics Letters, 141, 173-176. DOI

  • We study experimentally to what extent distributive fairness decisions by impartial authorities are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness opinions. In a three-player allocation game, we compare Communication treatments, in which one of the stakeholders states her opinion prior to the allocation decision, to a Baseline without communication. We find that stakeholders who state their opinion are allocated significantly less money than their counterparts in the Baseline. Asymmetric reactions to the statements appear to be the driving force behind this result: Authorities deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow stakeholders’ opinions if the requests are moderate; they largely ignore high monetary requests.

Engel, Christoph; Kleine, Marco (2015). Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation, Research Policy, 44 (1), 20-33. DOI

  • In the policy debate, intellectual property is often justified by what seems to be a straightforward argument: if innovators are not protected against others appropriating their ideas, incentives for innovation are suboptimally low. Now, in most industries and for most potential users, appropriating a foreign innovation is itself an investment decision fraught with cost and risk. Nonetheless, standard theory predicts too little innovation. Arguably the problem is exacerbated by the sensitivity of innovators to fairness; imitators do get a free lunch, after all. We model the situation as a game and test it in the lab. We find more appropriation, but also more innovation than predicted by standard theory. In the lab, the prospect of giving imitators a free lunch does not have a chilling effect on innovation. This even holds if innovation automatically spills over to an outsider and if successful imitation reduces the innovator's profit. Beliefs and the analysis of experiences in the repeated game demonstrate that participants are sensitive to the fairness problem. But this concern is not strong enough to outweigh the robust propensity to invest even more in innovation than predicted by standard theory. The data suggest that this behavior results from the intention not to be outperformed by one's peers.

Monographien

Kleine, Marco (2015). Communication and Fairness: An Experimental Economics Approach. Jena: Friedrich-Schiller-Universität.

Diskussionspapiere

Kleine, Marco (2021). No eureka! Incentives Hurt Creative Breakthrough Irrespective of the Incentives' Frame, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 21-15. DOI

  • We investigate the effect of financial incentives, framed as gains and losses, on creative breakthrough. Rather than originating merely from diligent work, creative breakthrough entails a eureka-moment – the sudden insight and the radical reorganization of ideas for the solution of a problem. We argue that financial incentives can be detrimental for creative breakthrough. Moreover, framing financial incentives as losses may lead to particularly strong detrimental effects, compared to incentives framed as gains. We test our hypotheses in a laboratory experiment using a classical paradigm to investigate creative breakthrough: the candle problem (Duncker 1945). We find causal evidence that, relative to a condition without performance-contingent incentives, financial incentives are counterproductive for creative breakthrough. This holds true for financial incentives framed as gains as well as for those framed as losses. We do not find any significant differences arising from the framing of incentives. Financial incentives and the loss framing of incentives are classical managerial tools for enhancing employee performance. They have proven effective for routine tasks. Our results, however, suggest that their success cannot be generalized to work environments that build on people's ability to achieve breakthroughs via eureka-moments.

Mickeler, Maren; Khashabi, Pooyan; Kleine, Marco; Kretschmer, Tobias (2021). Under the Radar: User Anonymity in the Design of Organizational Platforms, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 19-17. DOI

  • Organizational exchange platforms enable efficient allocation and exchange of members’ resources like information, advice or help within organizations. Yet, employee engagement remains a challenge for the success of these platforms. Focusing on the resource seeker-side, we argue that individuals’ seeking behavior is influenced by (a) intangible, psychological costs, and (b) tangible, economic considerations, and suggest that both types of costs are linked to the provision of information on seekers’ identity. By conducting a lab experiment, we alter participants’ costs when seeking resources on a platform. We find that both type of costs reduce individuals’ seeking behavior. While men are chiefly discouraged by economic consequences, females place relatively more emphasis on psychological costs. Our results highlight the facilitating role of user anonymity on platform engagement.

Kleine, Marco; Heite, Jonas; Rosendahl Huber, Laura (2020). Subsidized R&D Collaboration: The Causal Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Performance, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 20-11. DOI

  • We study the causal effect of subsidized R&D collaboration on innovation performance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In particular, we make use of a randomized controlled trial to analyze the effect of a nationwide innovation voucher scheme in the United Kingdom that grants SMEs across all industries financial support of up to 5,000 GBP for engaging the services of experts, e.g., from universities, research institutes or IP advisors, when pursuing an innovation-related project. Our results show that the innovation voucher program successfully promotes the execution of these innovation projects with positive short- and medium-term effects on product and service development, internal processes and intellectual property protection. Based on our results, we also provide some practical guidance to further improve the effectiveness of voucher programs.
  • Also published in: Academy of Management Proceedings Vol. 2020, No. 1

Fischer, Sven; Kleine, Marco; Zizzo, Daniel John (2017). The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination: An Experimental Study, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 17-05.

  • Using controlled and incentivized decision experiments, we explore whether the length of compliance periods in patent examinations affects behaviour and the overall efficiency of the system. In our stylized experiments, participants decide in the role of a patentee who faces uncertainty about the prospects of the application and must invest real effort over an extended period of time, in order to reach a minimum threshold. Overall, we find some evidence that a very long time horizon outperforms a short one.
  • SSRN

Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian (2015). Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn/6. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

  • We study how upward communication – from workers to managers – about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be detrimental to workers’ performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with workers’ payments, and in workers being more sensitive to the perceived kindness of their relative wage payments. By varying the source and degree of information about individual efforts between treatments, we see that precise knowledge about workers’ actual contributions to the team output is beneficial for the success of gift-exchange relationships. Yet, workers’ self-assessments can be a problematic tool to gather this information.
  • http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2015_06online.pdf

Vorträge

29.10.2020
A Dynamic Perspective on Competition and Fraudulent Behavior – Experimental Evidence
Strategic Management Society Annual Conference
Ort: online


01.10.2020
A Dynamic Perspective on Competition and Fraudulent Behavior – Experimental Evidence
6th CRC Retreat
Ort: online


10.09.2020
No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking
Economic Science Association 2020 Global Online Meetings
Ort: online


11.08.2020
Subsidized R&D Collaboration – The Causal Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Performance
Academy of Management Annual Meeting
Ort: online


10.08.2020
Competition Dynamics and Fraudulent Behavior – Evidence from a Multi-Period Experiment
Academy of Management Annual Meeting
Ort: online


19.03.2020
No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking
VHB-Jahrestagung
Ort: online


03.02.2020
No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking
Brown Bag-Seminar ESMT Berlin
Ort: Berlin


14.01.2020
No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking
BEWIP-Seminar
Ort: München


12.12.2019
No Face, No Name, No Shame? Overcoming Barriers to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking
Workshop on Entrepreneurship and Innovation
Ort: München


21.11.2019
Subsidized R&D Collaboration – The Causal Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Activity and Performance
IGL Winter Research Meeting
Ort: Amsterdam, Niederlande


11.10.2019
Creativity and Framed Incentives
ESA North American Meeting
Ort: Los Angeles, Kalifornien, USA


27.09.2019
Impediments to Intra-Organizational Public Knowledge-Seeking
6th CRC Retreat
Ort: Tutzing


12.09.2019
Subsidized R&D Collaboration – The Causal Effect of Innovation Vouchers on Innovation Activity and Performance
Jahrestagung der Wissenschaftlichen Kommission Technologie, Innovation und Entrepreneurship (VHB-TIE)
Ort: Darmstadt


17.06.2019
Creativity and Framed Incentives: An Experiment
Munich Summer Institute, Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb
Ort: München


08.01.2019
Creativity and Framed Incentives: An Experiment
ORG Seminar
Ort: München


18.12.2018
Creativity and Framed Incentives: An Experiment
BEWIP-Seminar
Ort: München


20.09.2018
The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination
VHB-TIE-Jahrestagung
Ort: Hamburg


14.08.2018
The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination: An Experimental Study
Academy of Management 78th Annual Meeting
Ort: Chicago, USA


30.06.2018
Creativity and Framed Incentives
ESA World Meeting
Ort: Berlin


06.06.2018
The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination
Munich Summer Institute
Ort: München


24.05.2018
The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination: An Experimental Study
VHB-Jahrestagung
Ort: Magdeburg


06.10.17 - 07.10.17

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

12th Nordic Conference on Behavioural and Experimental Economics

 Ort: Göteborg, Schweden


27.09.17 - 29.09.17

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

2nd Retreat of CRC TRR 190 (Collaborative Research Center Rationality and Competition)

Ort: München


08.09.17 - 09.09.17

Paneldiskussion zum Hindsight Bias

Zurich IP Retreat 2017: The Hindsight Bias in Patent Law

Ort: Zürich, Schweiz


20.06.17 - 23.06.17

Disguising Selfishness With and Without Communication

ESA International Conference

Ort: San Diego, USA


18.05.17 - 20.05.17

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Conference Incentives and Behavior Change

Ort: Modica, Italien


06.06.16 - 07.06.16

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Workshop on Experimental Economics in Strasbourg

Ort: Straßburg, Frankreich


22.03.16

Methoden der experimentellen Ökonomie in der juristischen Forschung am Beispiel von Engel/Kleine, Who Is Afraid of Pirates?, Research Policy 2016

Universität St. Gallen: Masterlehrgang in Law and Economics

Ort: St. Gallen, Schweiz


28.09.15 - 30.09.15

Disguising Selfishness With and Without Communication

Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Ort: Hamburg


16.06.15

Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation

2015 International Workshop on Patent System and Inventor

Ort: München


08.06.15

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

8th Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium

Ort: Maastricht, Niederlande


07.05.15 - 10.05.15

Disguising Selfishness With and Without Communication

Conference Incentives and Behavior Change

Ort: Modica, Italien


14.01.15

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

TIME Colloquium

Ort: München


03.12.14

Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation

Workshop: Challenges of Knowledge Creation - Intellectual Property Protection and Innovation Performance

Ort: München


28.11.14 - 29.11.14

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Workshop on Co-determination and Employee Participation

Ort: Trier


04.09.14 - 05.09.14

Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation

9th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association

Ort: Brüssel, Belgien


15.05.14 - 18.05.14

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Conference Incentives and Behavior Change

Ort: Amsterdam, Niederlande


06.03.14 - 08.03.14

Poster: Fairness and Persuasion. How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making

Konferenz: Taxation, Social Norms and Compliance

Ort: Nürnberg

Lehrveranstaltungen

Wintersemester 2020 - 2021

General Economics

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2020 - 2021

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2019 - 2020

General Economics

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2019 - 2020

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2019 - 2020

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Sommersemester 2019

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Change Management

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Strategy and Leadership

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Frontiers in Strategy Research

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Projektkurse

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Seminar Strategische Unternehmensführung

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2018 - 2019

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Sommersemester 2018

Projektkurse

Ort: LMU München


Sommersemester 2018

Seminar Strategische Unternehmensführung

Ort: LMU München


Sommersemester 2018

Vorlesung Strategische Unternehmensführung

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2017 - 2018

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Wintersemester 2017 - 2018

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Sommersemester 2017

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Wintersemester 2016 - 2017

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Sommersemester 2016

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Sommersemester 2016

Advanced Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2012 - 2013

Grundzüge der VWL: Einführung in die Mikroökonomik (Tutorium)

Ort: Universität Bonn

Projekte