Dr. Marco Kleine

Senior Research Fellow

Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research

+49 89 24246-581
marco.kleine(at)ip.mpg.de

Arbeitsbereiche:

Innovationsforschung, Strategische Unternehmensführung, Experimentalökonomik, Verhaltensökonomik, Organisationsökonomik, Personalökonomik

Wissenschaftlicher Werdegang

Seit 05/2018
Professor für Strategische Unternehmensführung an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (Vertretungsprofessur)

Seit 2014
Wissenschaftlicher Referent am Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb (Innovation and Entrepreneurship Research)

2011 - 2014
Stipendiat am Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Gemeinschaftsgütern in Bonn, Mitglied der Max Planck Research School "IMPRS Uncertainty" und Doktorand an der Universität Jena

09/2013 - 12/2013
Forschungsaufenthalt an der University of California, San Diego (Rady School of Management)

2008 - 2010
Studium der Volkswirtschaftslehre (M.Sc.) an der Universität Bonn

2006 - 2008
Vertriebs- und Projektkaufmann für internationale Projekte bei der Siemens AG in Braunschweig

2003 - 2007
Studium der Betriebswirtschaftslehre (B.A.) an der Fachhochschule für Wirtschaft Berlin

2003 - 2006
Ausbildung zum Industriekaufmann bei der Siemens AG in Berlin, Braunschweig, Erlangen, München und Santiago de Chile

Mitgliedschaften

Collaborative Research Center (CRC) TRR 190 Rationality and Competition 2017-2020

Innovation Growth Lab Research Network

Economics Science Association

Academy of Management

Publikationen

Artikel in referierten Fachzeitschriften

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia (2017). How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision-makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 143, 241-253. DOI

  • This paper studies how participation in decision procedures affects people’s reactions to the deciding authority. In our economic experiment, having voice, i.e., the opportunity to state one’s opinion prior to a decision, significantly increases subordinates’ subsequent kindness towards the authority. These positive effects occur irrespectively of the decisions’ content. The experimental findings stress the positive effects of voice when subordinates and authorities interact. Our results suggest that in organizations, but also in the legal and political arena, participative decision-making can be used to guide people’s actions after decisions have been made.
  • Also published at SSRN as: MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2013/11

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia (2016). Fairness and Persuasion: How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making, Economics Letters, 141, 173-176. DOI

  • We study experimentally to what extent distributive fairness decisions by impartial authorities are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness opinions. In a three-player allocation game, we compare Communication treatments, in which one of the stakeholders states her opinion prior to the allocation decision, to a Baseline without communication. We find that stakeholders who state their opinion are allocated significantly less money than their counterparts in the Baseline. Asymmetric reactions to the statements appear to be the driving force behind this result: Authorities deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow stakeholders’ opinions if the requests are moderate; they largely ignore high monetary requests.

Engel, Christoph; Kleine, Marco (2015). Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation, Research Policy, 44 (1), 20-33. DOI

  • In the policy debate, intellectual property is often justified by what seems to be a straightforward argument: if innovators are not protected against others appropriating their ideas, incentives for innovation are suboptimally low. Now, in most industries and for most potential users, appropriating a foreign innovation is itself an investment decision fraught with cost and risk. Nonetheless, standard theory predicts too little innovation. Arguably the problem is exacerbated by the sensitivity of innovators to fairness; imitators do get a free lunch, after all. We model the situation as a game and test it in the lab. We find more appropriation, but also more innovation than predicted by standard theory. In the lab, the prospect of giving imitators a free lunch does not have a chilling effect on innovation. This even holds if innovation automatically spills over to an outsider and if successful imitation reduces the innovator's profit. Beliefs and the analysis of experiences in the repeated game demonstrate that participants are sensitive to the fairness problem. But this concern is not strong enough to outweigh the robust propensity to invest even more in innovation than predicted by standard theory. The data suggest that this behavior results from the intention not to be outperformed by one's peers.

Monographien

Kleine, Marco (2015). Communication and Fairness: An Experimental Economics Approach. Jena: Friedrich-Schiller-Universität.

Diskussionspapiere

Fischer, Sven; Kleine, Marco; Zizzo, Daniel John (2017). The Effect of Compliance Time in Patent Examination: An Experimental Study, Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper, No. 17-05.

  • Using controlled and incentivized decision experiments, we explore whether the length of compliance periods in patent examinations affects behaviour and the overall efficiency of the system. In our stylized experiments, participants decide in the role of a patentee who faces uncertainty about the prospects of the application and must invest real effort over an extended period of time, in order to reach a minimum threshold. Overall, we find some evidence that a very long time horizon outperforms a short one.
  • SSRN

Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian (2015). Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence, Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn/6. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

  • We study how upward communication – from workers to managers – about individual efforts affects the effectiveness of gift exchange as a contract-enforcement device for work teams. Our findings suggest that the use of such self-assessments can be detrimental to workers’ performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our workers regularly overstate their own contribution to the joint team output. Misreporting seems to spread distrust within the team of workers, as well as between managers and workers. This manifests itself in managers being less generous with workers’ payments, and in workers being more sensitive to the perceived kindness of their relative wage payments. By varying the source and degree of information about individual efforts between treatments, we see that precise knowledge about workers’ actual contributions to the team output is beneficial for the success of gift-exchange relationships. Yet, workers’ self-assessments can be a problematic tool to gather this information.
  • http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2015_06online.pdf

Vorträge

06.10.17 - 07.10.17

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

12th Nordic Conference on Behavioural and Experimental Economics

Ort: Göteborg, Schweden


27.09.17 - 29.09.17

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

2nd Retreat of CRC TRR 190 (Collaborative Research Center Rationality and Competition)

Ort: München


08.09.17 - 09.09.17

Paneldiskussion zum Hindsight Bias

Zurich IP Retreat 2017: The Hindsight Bias in Patent Law

Ort: Zürich, Schweiz


20.06.17 - 23.06.17

Disguising Selfishness With and Without Communication

ESA International Conference

Ort: San Diego, USA


18.05.17 - 20.05.17

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Conference Incentives and Behavior Change

Ort: Modica, Italien


06.06.16 - 07.06.16

Creativity and Framed Incentives: Experimental Evidence

Workshop on Experimental Economics in Strasbourg

Ort: Straßburg, Frankreich


22.03.16

Methoden der experimentellen Ökonomie in der juristischen Forschung am Beispiel von Engel/Kleine, Who Is Afraid of Pirates?, Research Policy 2016

Universität St. Gallen: Masterlehrgang in Law and Economics

Ort: St. Gallen, Schweiz


28.09.15 - 30.09.15

Disguising Selfishness With and Without Communication

Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Ort: Hamburg


16.06.15

Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation

2015 International Workshop on Patent System and Inventor

Ort: München


08.06.15

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

8th Maastricht Behavioral and Experimental Economics Symposium

Ort: Maastricht, Niederlande


07.05.15 - 10.05.15

Disguising Selfishness With and Without Communication

Conference Incentives and Behavior Change

Ort: Modica, Italien


14.01.15

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

TIME Colloquium

Ort: München


03.12.14

Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation

Workshop: Challenges of Knowledge Creation - Intellectual Property Protection and Innovation Performance

Ort: München


28.11.14 - 29.11.14

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Workshop on Co-determination and Employee Participation

Ort: Trier


04.09.14 - 05.09.14

Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation

9th Annual Conference of the EPIP Association

Ort: Brüssel, Belgien


15.05.14 - 18.05.14

Communication and Trust in Principal-Team Relationships: Experimental Evidence

Conference Incentives and Behavior Change

Ort: Amsterdam, Niederlande


06.03.14 - 08.03.14

Poster: Fairness and Persuasion. How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making

Konferenz: Taxation, Social Norms and Compliance

Ort: Nürnberg

Lehrveranstaltungen

Wintersemester 2017 - 2018

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Sommersemester 2017

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Wintersemester 2016 - 2017

Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Sommersemester 2016

Valuation of Intangible Assets

Ort: Munich Intellectual Property Law Center (MIPLC), Deutschland


Sommersemester 2016

Advanced Experimental Methods

Ort: LMU München


Wintersemester 2012 - 2013

Grundzüge der VWL: Einführung in die Mikroökonomik (Tutorium)

Ort: Universität Bonn

Projekte