Dr. Matthias Lamping

Herausgeberschaften

A Critical Mind - Hanns Ullrich’s Footprint in Internal Market Law, Antitrust and Intellectual Property (forthcoming) (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2022 (gemeinsam mit Christine Godt).

Smart Urban Mobility - Law, Regulation, and Policy (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 29), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2020, VI + 340 S. (gemeinsam mit Michele Finck et al.).

The Impact of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, No. 18-20), Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich 2018, 182 S. (gemeinsam mit Hanns Ullrich). DOI

• Rezensiert von: Winfried Tilmann, GRUR Int. 2018, S. 1094
• 18-20.pdf

TRIPS plus 20 - From Trade Rules to Market Principles (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition, 25), Springer, Heidelberg; Berlin 2016, XVII + 760 S. (gemeinsam mit Hanns Ullrich et al.). DOI

• Rezensiert von: Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, IIC 2017, S. 245

Herausforderung Innovation - eine interdisziplinäre Debatte (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 17), Springer, Berlin [u.a.] 2011, X + 168 S. (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger). DOI

Monographien und andere selbständige Publikationen

Patentschutz und Marktmacht (Schriftenreihe zum gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, 169), Carl Heymanns, Köln 2010, XXVII + 508 S.

• (Dissertation)
• Rezensiert von: Claudia Seitz, WuW 2013, S. 1095
• Rezensiert von: Rudolf Teschemacher, GRUR Int. 2012, S. 695
• Der Aberglaube, dass Immaterialgüterrechte gegenüber kartellrechtlichen Eingriffen immun sind, gilt nicht erst seit gestern als überholt. Der europäischen Rechtsprechung liegt jedoch nach wie vor eine unangebrachte Ehrfurcht zugrunde, die es zu überwinden gilt. Die Verinnerlichung einer grundlegenden Erkenntnis ist dabei conditio sine qua non: Die Beschränkung des freien Imitationswettbewerbs durch das Patentrecht ist nicht mehr und nicht weniger als eine Rahmenregelung der marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung, die definitionsgemäß auf Wettbewerb beruht. Das Patent ist kein Eigentumsrecht im klassischen Sinne, sondern ein Instrument der Wettbewerbspolitik. Es liegt damit auf der Hand, dass das Kartellrecht in der Lage sein muss, wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Nutzungen von Patenten Einhalt zu gebieten, die über den Kerngehalt der Technologieförderung hinausgehen. Dass die Interessen des Patentinhabers unter Umständen dem öffentlichen Interesse an einem funktionierenden Wettbewerb unterzuordnen sind, soll dem nicht entgegenstehen. Die verfestigte Eigentumslogik des geltenden Systems muss einem wettbewerbsorientierten Innovationsverständnis weichen. Je mehr sich die Daseinsführung eines Patents von seiner rechts- und wirtschaftspolitischen Ratio entfernt, desto mehr verblasst seine Daseinsberechtigung. Ein „Schutzrechtsmissbrauch“ ist vor diesem Hintergrund insbesondere dann zu erblicken, wenn das Schutzrecht in einer Weise instrumentalisiert wird, die nicht dem Schutz eigener legitimer Interessen dient, sondern dazu, Konkurrenten bei der Verfolgung ihrer legitimen Interessen zu behindern und den verbleibenden (Substitutions-) Wettbewerb zu beschränken. Der stetigen Ausweitung des Patentschutzes, die seit dem Zeitalter der Industrialisierung stattgefunden hat, ist mit einer flexiblen Anwendung der Wettbewerbsregeln entgegenzutreten. Gegenstand der Dissertation sind die verschiedenen Fallgruppen des Missbrauchsverbots (Art. 102 AEUV), die hierfür in Betracht kommen. Ein besonderes Augenmerk gilt dabei der europäischen Judikatur zur Missbräuchlichkeit von Lizenzverweigerungen („essential facility“-Doktrin) und der Anwendbarkeit des Missbrauchsverbots auf die Geschäftsgebaren sog. „Patenttrolle“.

Die herrschenden Wettbewerbskräfte bei Sekundärmärkten, Universität Salzburg, Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Salzburg 2006, IV + 117 S.

• (Diplomarbeit)

Beiträge in Sammelwerken, Kommentierungen, Handbüchern und Lexika

Intellectual Property Analytics, in: Martin Ebers (Hg.), StichwortKommentar Legal Tech - Recht, Geschäftsmodelle, Technik, Alphabetische Gesamtdarstellung, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2023, 646 - 653 (gemeinsam mit Justus Kapischke).

Preface, in: A Critical Mind - Hanns Ullrich’s Footprint in Internal Market Law, Antitrust and Intellectual Property (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2022, forthcoming.

Exclusive Rights for a Purpose – Intellectual Property as a Framework Regulation of Innovation Markets, in: A Critical Mind - Hanns Ullrich’s Footprint in Internal Market Law, Antitrust and Intellectual Property (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2022, forthcoming.

La Propiedad Intelectual en Latinoamérica y su Rol en el Desarrollo Económico y Social, in: Estudos de Propriedade Intelectual em Homenagem ao Prof. Dr. Denis Borges Barbosa, IODA - Instituto Observatório do Direito Autoral, Curitiba 2021, 25 - 64 (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty et al.).

• O texto trata do estabelecimento e evolução dos direitos da propriedade in-telectual na América Latina. Perpassa os contextos nos quais esses direitos foram incorporados ao arcabouço legal doméstico. Ainda que as economias latino-americanas sejam mais ou menos frágeis do ponto de vista da pro-priedade intelectual, as conclusões apontam que há diversos desafios a se-rem enfrentados, mas que os países da região têm potencial para superá-los e avançar na proteção e na utilização dos seus ativos intelectuais.
• This article deals with the establishment and evolution of intellectual property rights in Latin America. It goes through the contexts in which these rights have been in-corporated into the domestic legal framework. Although Latin American economies are more or less fragile from the point of view of intellectual property, the conclusions indicate that there are several challenges to be faced, but that the countries of the region have the potential to overcome them and advance in the protection and use of their intellectual assets.
• https://codaip.gedai.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/1_Estudos-de-Propriedade-Intelectual-em-homenagem-ao-Prof_Dr_Denis-Borges-Barbosa.pdf

Smart Urban Mobility as a Regulatory Challenge, in: Michele Finck et al. (Hg.), Smart Urban Mobility - Law, Regulation, and Policy (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 29), Springer, Berlin 2020, 1 - 17 (gemeinsam mit Michele Finck et al.). DOI

• The ‘smart city’ has become shorthand for developments in technology that influence how cities are organised and how citizens coexist in them. ‘Smart mobility’, one of its most visible sub-domains, has been considerably affected by ecological, demographic and economic pressures. Emerging methods of transporta-
  tion and innovative business models can overcome old problems, but they also pose
  new societal, economic and legal challenges. This introduction aims to shed light on
  the law, regulation and policy of ‘smart urban mobility’ by critically examining its
  substantial transformation from a regulatory perspective. It outlines the notion of the
  ‘smart city’, highlights trends in ‘smart’ urban mobility, points to related legal
  challenges and explains the conception and chapters of this book.

The Unified Patent Court, and How Brexit Breaks It, in: Matthias Lamping, Hanns Ullrich (Hg.), The Impact of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, No. 18-20) 2018, 117 - 182. DOI

General Introduction, in: Matthias Lamping, Hanns Ullrich (Hg.), The Impact of Brexit on Unitary Patent Protection and its Court (Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper, No. 18-20) 2018, 7 - 23 (gemeinsam mit Hanns Ullrich). DOI

Kapitel 1 - Grundlagen, Aufbau und Methodik, in: Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger (Hg.), Europäisches Immaterialgüterrecht - Funktionen und Perspektiven (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 26), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2018, 1 - 58 (gemeinsam mit Sophie Luise Bings et al.). DOI

Kapitel 3.3 - Spezifische Fehlstellungen mit Bezug auf den Binnenmarkt, in: Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger (Hg.), Europäisches Immaterialgüterrecht - Funktionen und Perspektiven (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 26), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2018, 451 - 663 (gemeinsam mit Seyavash Amini et al.). DOI

Kapitel 3.1 - Fehlstellungen mit Bezug auf die Voraussetzungen, die Reichweite und die Begrenzungen einzelner Schutzrechte, in: Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger (Hg.), Europäisches Immaterialgüterrecht - Funktionen und Perspektiven (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 26), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2018, 146 - 286 (gemeinsam mit Pedro Henrique D. Batista et al.). DOI

§ 4 - Kartellrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, in: Günter Henn, Louis Pahlow (Hg.), Patentvertragsrecht - Grundprinzipien, Vertragsformen, Rechtsgestaltung (Wirtschaftsrecht), 6. Aufl., C.F. Müller, Heidelberg 2016, 29 - 111.

Preface, in: Hanns Ullrich et al. (Hg.), TRIPS plus 20 - From Trade Rules to Market Principles (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 25), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2016, v - vii (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty et al.). DOI

Intellectual Property Harmonization in the Name of Trade, in: Hanns Ullrich et al. (Hg.), TRIPS plus 20 - From Trade Rules to Market Principles (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 25), Springer, Berlin; Heidelberg 2016, 313 - 358. DOI

• In order to enjoy credibility and acceptance among those involved, harmonization must be the outcome of a deliberative process with a defined goal, but without a predetermined solution. States need to be clear about the purpose of harmonization and the measures for achieving it; they need to agree about how to handle different needs, priorities and expectations; and they need to be prepared to accept compromises beyond their narrow self-interest. The TRIPS Agreement tells a different story. Countries have learned to live with it, but nobody is entirely happy. In order to make international law more inclusive and responsive to different socio-economic conditions and needs, the TRIPS Agreement needs to be reconceptualized as a market framework regulation that promotes competition and innovation but also allows states to regulate the use of intellectual property in ways that grow out of, and comply with, their own traditions and interests. This ultimately means that the marriage of convenience between trade and intellectual property may have to come to an end.

Block 1: Procedures to Obtain a Patent and Legal Framework, in: Europäsche Patentakademie, Europäisches Patentamt (Hg.), Patent Litigation A to Z, Europäisches Patentamt, München 2015 (gemeinsam mit Matthew Fisher et al.).

• https://e-courses.epo.org/course/view.php?id=57

Refusal to Licence as an Abuse of Market Dominance: From Commercial Solvents to Microsoft, in: Reto M. Hilty, Kung-Chung Liu (Hg.), Compulsory Licensing - Practical Experiences and Ways Forward (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 22), Springer, Berlin 2014, 121 - 148. DOI

• Although intellectual property rights do not automatically confer a dominant market position, they may put the right holder in the position to behave more or less independently of his or her competitors, customers, and ultimately consumers. The extent of the relative immunity from competition depends on a number of factors, from the specific characteristics of the protected subject matter through to the structure of the relevant market. In extreme cases, an intellectual property right will constitute an “essential facility” and therefore enable the right holder to control access to, and thus competition in, the market. In such cases, a refusal to license may lead to an abuse of market dominance within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the abuse may consist in a discrimination of trading partners, an unjustified foreclosure of competitors, a negligence of market needs, or an expansion of market power to another related market. However, a compulsory licence is not always the appropriate remedy to stop the established abuse, its anti-competitive effects, and its recurrence. In principle, the European Commission asks the dominant company to cease and desist from the abusive conduct, but it does not grant compulsory licences.

Die Vereinbarkeit des serbischen Immaterialgüterrechts mit der europäischen Durchsetzungsrichtlinie, in: Stefan Hülshörster, Dirk Mirow (Hg.), Deutsche Beratung bei Rechts- und Justizreformen im Ausland - 20 Jahre Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale Rechtliche Zusammenarbeit (IRZ), BWV - Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, Berlin 2012, 303 - 315 (gemeinsam mit Kaya Köklü).

Innovationsförderung nach TRIPS - Zwischen progressiver Liberalisierung und regulativem Fundamentalismus, in: Reto M. Hilty, Thomas Jaeger, Matthias Lamping (Hg.), Herausforderung Innovation (MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 17), Springer, Heidelberg [u.a.] 2011, 119 - 144. DOI

Trennungsprinzip - Quo vadis, Germania?, in: 50 Jahre Bundespatentgericht - Festschrift zum 50-jährigen Bestehen des Bundespatentgerichts am 1. Juli 2011, Carl Heymanns, Köln 2011, 255 - 273 (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty).

Aufsätze

IP-Based Incentives Against Antimicrobial Crisis: A European Perspective, IIC 50, 1 (2019), 30 - 76 (gemeinsam mit Pedro Henrique D. Batista et al.). DOI

• The field of antimicrobials is considered to be facing a crisis. Increasing
  microbial resistance is creating a demand for new drugs, which however is not being
  matched by privately funded R&D. The reasons for this market failure are of a
  technical and economic nature. The present article analyzes what changes to IP-
  based incentives are conceivable in the European Union (EU) in order to address the
  antimicrobial crisis. Since the assessment of the suitability of the analyzed options
  depends on interdisciplinary research, this article also proposes a research agenda to
  be considered for the implementation of public policies in this field.

Eyes Wide Shut, IIC 49, 8 (2018), 887 - 894 (gemeinsam mit Siegfried Broß). DOI

Das Störpotenzial des rechtsstaatlich-demokratischen Ordnungsrahmens am Beispiel der europäischen Patentgerichtsbarkeit, GRUR Int 67, 10 (2018), 907 - 911 (gemeinsam mit Siegfried Broß).

Patent Declaration: Reasons and Purposes, UC Irvine Law Review 16, 3 (2016), 469 - 482 (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty).

• http://bit.ly/2marpE5

Declaration on Patent Protection, IIC 45, 6 (2014), 679 - 698 (gemeinsam mit Dan L. Burk et al.). DOI

• Auch veröffentlicht in: Intellectual Property Law and Policy Journal, 2014, Vol. 45, 1 - 32 (in Japanese)
• As a framework regulation for innovation markets, the patent system needs to be tailored to the innovation process, which it is supposed to serve, and to the competitive environment, within which it must operate. In order to ensure an efficient functionality of the patent system as an innovation policy tool, patent rights ought to be defined, justified and continually reconsidered by reference to their socio-economic benefits and costs.
  
  Sovereign states should retain the discretion to adopt a patent system that best suits their technological capabilities as well as their social, cultural and economic needs and priorities, with the proviso that the exercise of such discretion must remain within the boundaries of international law. Taking into account the customary principles of interpretation of international law, this Declaration seeks to shed light on these boundaries. The purpose is to clarify the policy space that the ‘Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS Agreement) leaves to national legislators and judicial authorities with regard to the implementation and administration of their patent systems.
  
  When the world’s major patent systems first developed into their present form, nation states were able to engage in the regulatory design process under conditions of high sovereign autonomy. Over the past decades, this autonomy has been progressively eroded. Today, states face a legal and institutional regime consisting of multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, which are becoming increasingly complex and set more and more limits to their regulatory freedom.
  
  As a result, the ability of states to maintain a proper balance between the need for protection of knowledge goods in global markets, the freedom to regulate national or regional innovation markets, and the policy space for pursuing diverse public interest goals risks becoming unduly constrained. This Declaration seeks to clarify some of the regulatory options states still retain under international law, in particular the TRIPS Agreement.
• Auch veröffentlicht als Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-19
• http://bit.ly/2kIgLUI

Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Unitary Patent Protection: Testing the Boundaries of the Rule of Law Cases C-274/11 and 295/11 Kingdom of Spain and Italian Republic v. Council of the European Union, Judgment of 16 April 2013, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 20, 4 (2013), 589 - 600. DOI

• Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper

Principles for Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional Agreements, IIC 44, 8 (2013), 878 - 883 (gemeinsam mit Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan et al.). DOI

• For several years, research at the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual
  Property and Competition Law (MPI) - in collaboration with experts from all over
  the world - has examined the trend of bilateral and regional agreements that
  include provisions on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property (IP)
  rights. By building on this research, the following principles
  – express core concerns regarding the use of IP provisions as a bargaining chip in
  international trade negotiations, the increasing comprehensiveness of international IP
  rules and the lack of transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiating process; and
  – recommend international rules and procedures that can achieve a better,
  mutually advantageous and balanced regulation of international IP.
  These principles emanate from several consultations within the MPI and especially
  from a workshop that was held with external experts in October 2012 in Munich,
  Germany. They represent the views of those first signatories and are open to
  signature by scholars who share the objectives of the Principles.
• Institutswebsite

Enhanced Cooperation – A Proper Approach to Market Integration in the Field of Unitary Patent Protection?, IIC 42, 8 (2011), 879 - 925.

Entscheidungsanmerkungen

Shackles for Bees? The ECJ's Decision of GMO-Contaminated Honey, European Journal of Risk Regulation 3, 1 (2012), 123 - 129. DOI

• An old German proverb says: What the farmer doesn't know he doesn't eat. In the case of the Bablok decision delivered by the European Court of Justice on 6 September 2011, it is not the farmers, but the judges who seem to be wary about the unknown. According to their judgement, substances derived from genetically modified plants require market authorisation to be placed on the market as food, even if the substance itself is not fertile anymore. Since the Court takes the view that pollen is an ingredient of honey rather than a natural component, honey contaminated with pollen from genetically modified organisms will fall within the classification of foodstuffs requiring marketing authorisation. So whenever a bee collects pollen from a genetically modified plant, this can make the entire honey harvest unmarketable. Not even the slightest contamination will be tolerated, irrespective of whether it was intentional. Because the prohibition to put unauthorised honey on the market applies abstractly, regardless of whether there is a concrete risk for the health of consumers, the judgement will have considerable impact on the coexistence of conventional, ecological and genetically-modified farming.

Monsanto Case Note - Purpose-Bound Patent Protection for Genes, European Journal of Risk Regulation 1, 4 (2010), 445 - 450. DOI

• Case C-428/08, Monsanto Technology [2010]
  The Biotech Directive does not provide for absolute patent protection of DNA sequences. Protection is subject and restricted to the disclosed function (or purpose) of a gene; if the function is not fulfilled at the time of the alleged infringement the protection is therefore suspended. National law may not depart from the protection conferred by the Directive due to its exhaustive character (author's headnote).
  

Rezensionen

Rezension von: Adler, David B.: US-discovery und deutscher Patentverletzungsprozess. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2014, 536 S., ISBN 978-3-428-14254-5., GRUR Int 64, 4 (2015), 409 - 410.

Rezension von: Götting, Horst-Peter / Hetmank, Sven / Schwipps, Karsten: Patentrecht. C.H. Beck, München 2014, XIX, 211 S., ISBN 978-3-406-66619-3, GRUR Int 64, 3 (2015), 300.

Tagungs- und Diskussionsberichte

The AGA-Occlutech Decision of the German Federal Court of Justice – Confusion on a Higher Level?, Union Conference Report 2012 (gemeinsam mit Kaya Köklü).

• http://www.union-ip.org/union/WebObjects/un.woa/wa/downloadDocument?id=793
• Event: Roundtable on Enablement and Claim Scope, Munich, 2012-02-24

Securing Patent Rights through Customs Measures – Conference Report on the UNION Spring Round Table, GRUR Int 60, 7 (2011), 599 - 602 (gemeinsam mit Kaya Köklü).

• Event: UNION Spring Round Table, München, 2011-02-25

Forschungspapiere

Implementation of Patent Flexibilities in Asia (forthcoming), Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper 2022 (gemeinsam mit Juan I. Correa).

Implementation of Patent Flexibilities in Latin American (forthcoming), Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper 2022 (gemeinsam mit Juan I. Correa).

Implementación de las Flexibilidades del Sistema de Patentes en Países Seleccionados de Latinoamérica (forthcoming), Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper 2022,.2022 (gemeinsam mit Juan I. Correa).

Stellungnahmen

Revisiting the Framework for Compulsory Licensing of Patents in the European Union, 2023, 27 S. (gemeinsam mit Pedro Henrique D. Batista et al.).

• Within the scope of its initiative on “Compulsory Licensing in the EU”, the European Commission launched a call for evidence on 1 April 2022 and a public consultation on 7 July 2022 with the aim of gathering views from stakeholders. The objective of this initiative is to explore the possibility of revising the framework for compulsory licensing in the EU to make it more “adequately prepared and coordinated to tackle future crises”. The authors of this position paper welcome the Commission’s attempt to reinvigorate the public discourse on this important subject. This paper addresses selected aspects by way of a preliminary, non-exhaustive note on: the proposed reform’s scope and the grounds for a compulsory licence; the requirements of prior negotiation and licensing failure; government use; procedural matters; compulsory licences for patent applications and products; the relation with other regulations and sui generis regimes (i.e. trade secret protection, regulatory data protection, and supplementary protection certificates); the concept of adequate remuneration; compulsory licences for European patents with unitary effect; and the exhaustion of products placed on the market under a compulsory licence.
• Opinion published as Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 23-07

Position Statement of 5 July 2022 on the Decision of the WTO Ministerial Conference on the TRIPS Agreement adopted on 17 June 2022, 2022, 8 S. (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty et al.).

• On 17 June 2022, after nearly one and a half years of intense debate concerning the proposal to waive IP protection in view of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization adopted a decision on the TRIPS Agreement. It has not waived any intellectual property rights as such but instead mainly clarified the application of the existing TRIPS flexibilities, in particular, regarding compulsory licensing of patents. The Position Statement shows that the Ministerial Decision makes no substantive difference in the existing international legal framework, except for lifting the limitation on the exportation of vaccines manufactured in accordance with the Decision. To the extent that the Decision can make the application of TRIPS flexibilities more expedient, it is to be welcomed. At the same time, it is argued that such facilitating effect should not be limited to, or justified by, the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. More critically, it should not be restricted to COVID-19 vaccines, of which there is currently no shortage – rather, the same level of TRIPS flexibilities should apply to all medicinal products needed to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic.
• 2022-07-05__2._Position_Statement_Covid_IP_Waiver.pdf
• Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 22-14

Covid-19 and the Role of Intellectual Property - Position Statement of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition of 7 May 2021, 2021, 11 S. (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty et al.).

• In this Statement, the authors take a position on the waiver of intellectual property (IP) protection currently being considered by the members of the World Trade Organisation. The waiver was initiated by India and South Africa as a measure to enable rapid access to affordable medical products that are necessary to combat Covid-19. The initiative gained momentum after the US decided to support it. The authors do not consider this path to be expedient. The Statement presents factual and legal arguments why a comprehensive waiver of IP protection is unlikely to be a necessary and suitable measure towards the pursued objective. Overall, it argues that IP rights may so far have played an enabling and facilitating rather than hindering role in overcoming Covid-19. The global community might not be better off if IP rights are waived, neither during nor after the pandemic. There are more efficient and direct ways to supply developing countries with vaccines quickly – if the industrialised countries are willing to do their share.
• 2021_05_25_Position_statement_Covid_IP_waiver.pdf
• Also published as: Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 21-13

Stellungnahme zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Vereinfachung und Modernisierung des Patentrechts, 2020, 16 S. (gemeinsam mit Luc Desaunettes-Barbero et al.).

• Das Max-Planck-Institut für Innovation und Wettbewerb nimmt hiermit zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Vereinfachung und Modernisierung des Patentrechts Stellung, der vom Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz im Januar 2020 vorgelegt wurde. Das Institut begrüßt die Initiative des Ministeriums, empfiehlt im Hinblick auf die Beschränkung des patentrechtlichen Unterlassungsanspruchs und die Stärkung des Schutzes von Geschäftsgeheimnissen in Patentstreitsachen jedoch gewisse Präzisierungen.
  Mit Blick auf die Beschränkung des Unterlassungsanspruchs nach Maßgabe des Grundsatzes der Verhältnismäßigkeit wird vorgeschlagen, die Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung nicht auf einen Anwendungsfall der Gebote von Treu und Glauben zu reduzieren, sondern im Sinne der ratio legis des Patentrechts zu verstehen; insoweit als Maßnahme zur Verhinderung dysfunktionaler Effekte des Ausschließlichkeitsrecht bzw. des damit verbundenen Unterlassungsanspruchs. Zur Veranschaulichung des Ansatzes wird auf die Fallgruppen der komplexen Produkte, der Patentverwerter und der standardessenziellen Patente Bezug genommen, ohne sie jedoch im Detail durchzuprüfen. Mit Blick auf die im Rahmen der Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung vorzunehmende Interessenabwägung wird darauf hingewiesen, dass die Interessen des Patentinhabers gegenüber jenen des Verletzers keinen grundsätzlichen Vorrang genießen. Darüber hinaus sind bei der Abwägung nicht nur die Interessen der Streitparteien, sondern auch jene Dritter, insbesondere das öffentliche Interesse, zu berücksichtigen.
  Mit Blick auf den Schutz von Geschäftsgeheimnissen in Patentstreitsachen verweist die Stellungnahme auf Unzulänglichkeiten des Verfahrens in Geschäftsgeheimnisstreitsachen, die durch die angedachte Anwendung der entsprechenden Vorschriften auf das Patentstreitverfahren übertragen werden. Hingewiesen wird auch auf eine mögliche Regelungslücke in Bezug auf das "Düsseldorfer Verfahren", die von Patentinhabern für sog. "fishing expeditions" ausgenutzt werden könnte.
  
• This position paper of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition provides comments on the amendments proposed by the German Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection in its discussion draft of January 2020 on the modernization and simplification of the German Patent Act. While the Institute generally welcomes the initiative, the paper offers some suggestions aimed at increasing precision in the areas of first, the concept and the implementation of the proportionality test for granting injunctive relief, and, second, the need for enhanced protection of trade secrets in patent disputes.
  
  With regard to the proportionality assessment, the Institute suggests that, rather than reducing it to an application of the principle of good faith, the concept of proportionality should be interpreted and applied in light of the ratio legis of patent protection with a view to preventing dysfunctional effects potentially resulting from the exercise of the exclusive right and the associated claim to an injunction. Scenarios involving complex products, non-practicing entities and standard-essential patents are used to illustrate the approach. As regards the weighing and balancing of interests when assessing proportionality, the position paper argues that it is neither desirable nor appropriate to prioritize the interests of the patentee over those of the infringer as a matter of principle. In addition, it is not only the interests of parties to the dispute, but also those of third parties, in particular the public interest, that should be taken into account.
  
  With regard to the protection of trade secrets in patent disputes, the position paper refers to certain procedural insufficiencies of the Trade Secrets Act to adequately protect the defendant’s secrecy interests. It also points out a potential loophole in relation to the "Düsseldorf proceedings" that may facilitate "fishing expeditions".
• Stellungnahme_2020-03-1final.pdf
• Also published at SSRN as Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Discussion Paper No. 16
• English version published under the title: Position Paper on the Envisaged Reform of the German Patent Act as Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 20-05

Stellungnahme zum Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anpassung patentrechtlicher Vorschriften auf Grund der europäischen Patentreform, 2016, 15 S. (gemeinsam mit Roberto Romandini, Reto M. Hilty).

• Also published in: GRUR Int 65,6 (2016), 554-560
• StnRefE_Gesetz_Anpassung_patentrecht_Vorschriften_aufgrund_europaeische_Patentreform Copy.pdf
• http://bit.ly/2lSFLZC

Comments of the Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law on the Preliminary Set of Provisions for the Rules of Procedure of the Unified Patent Court, 2013, 10 S. (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty et al.).

• This text is a re-formatted version of comments submitted by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law in the public consultation on the 15th draft for Rules of Procedure for the Unified Patent Court conducted between June and October 2013. The comments focus on those Rules and do, in particular, not duplicate criticism for the Unitary Patent Package voiced elsewhere. Three fundamental aspects of particular importance for the functionality of the procedural regime are identified: Warranting uniformity, safeguarding autonomy and establishing an adequate balance of rights and obligations between the parties.
  
  The comments underline that, within the strict bounds imposed by the Unitary Patent Package, the Rules offer a well elaborated and substantially comprehensive framework for patent litigation procedures. Nonetheless, certain parts fall short of answering to the requirements imposed by the complexities of the system in which they are embedded. In particular, the Rules should not shy away from suggesting solutions in politically delicate areas if essential for the overall balance and functioning of the system. This concerns, for example, the exercise of discretion regarding the choice of options pursuant to Art. 33(3) UPC or the balancing of interests in the context of granting injunctive relief.
• Also published as: Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper Series No. 13-16

The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern, 2012, 5 S. (gemeinsam mit Reto M. Hilty et al.).

• Auch veröffentlicht als: Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-12
• Auch veröffentlicht in: CIPA Journal, 2012, H. 10, 553 - 555
• A balanced, innovation-friendly and uniform patent system is indispensable for Europe. However, the latest EU proposal for a patent package (Patent Regulation and flanking court system) is both dangerous and misguided. While a superficial glance may create the false impression of a patent law advancement through the proposal, it instead actually threatens to forestall the necessary legal progress and innovation capacities for the foreseeable future. It might prove disastrous to implement a patent system which is already known to be detrimental from both the legal as well as the innovation perspectives. This paper provides a short introduction to the major reasons for concern regarding the current proposals and explains why it is imperative to reconsider the proposals entirely afresh.
• MPI-IP_Twelve-Reasons_2012-10-17.pdf
• SSRN-Paper
• Institutswebsite

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